“Xishuangbanna Abandoned Property Owners Suppressed While Seeking Audience with Governor (Nov 18, 2025)”
On November 18, in Xishuangbanna, Yunnan Province, owners of the Wanxiangcheng development who went to the prefectural government to petition for their rights were suppressed by police, with multiple people taken into custody.
Wanxiangcheng, located on Mannongfeng Street in Jinghong City, Xishuangbanna, was originally named “Banna Story” and developed by Xishuangbanna Tianrui Real Estate Co., Ltd. The project has been stalled since 2018 due to a broken funding chain. According to Leju Finance, Tianrui Real Estate Co., Ltd. and its legal representative Chen Bin were restricted from high-consumption activities in 2022 because they failed to fulfill legally binding payment obligations within the timeframe specified in the enforcement notice.
Owners reported that despite protesting for more than six months, neither the Xishuangbanna government nor Tianrui Real Estate has provided any substantive solution. During this period, some owners were reportedly harassed by police over the phone under the pretext of “legal education,” and in some cases, drunk police officers even entered homes to intimidate residents.
Footage from the scene shows owners holding signs reading “Meet the Governor, Help with Resettlement” and “Tianrui Company, Fraud Syndicate” while protesting in front of the Xishuangbanna prefectural government, demanding to see the governor. Plainclothes officers then arrested multiple people. One male owner was reportedly restrained on the ground with his hands cuffed behind his back for an extended period before being taken away. As of November 19, the whereabouts of the arrested owners remain unknown.
“Hundreds of High School Students in Longli, Guizhou Rally Against ‘Prison-Style’ Management (2025.11.17)”
Hundreds of students at Longli No.1 High School in Guizhou launched a collective action this Monday, gathering in front of their dormitory building and chanting slogans to protest the “prison-style” schedule the school began enforcing that day.
The incident stemmed from a new timetable the school released on November 11. According to the plan, students must complete 13 class periods each day, plus morning reading. To fit in such an intense workload, the school requires students to wake up at 6 a.m. and go to bed at 11:10 p.m. This means students get less than seven hours of sleep per night— even with a one-hour lunch break added, it still falls short of the eight hours recommended by China’s National Health Commission for high school students. What angered students further was that the new rules require them to take their lunch break in the classroom and forbid returning to the dorms. Many said that sleeping face-down on a desk cannot provide any real rest. Such high-intensity scheduling and reduced sleep, they argue, will inevitably damage their physical and mental health.
After the timetable was published, students quickly voiced strong dissatisfaction on social media, sparking widespread resonance. Among the posts, an article titled “Youth Kidnapped by Time” spread widely among students. It sharply criticized this distorted education model and asked: “Is this a school meant to nurture talent, or a factory assembly line?” The article said this approach not only harms students’ health—leading to “rising myopia rates, sleep deprivation, and younger psychological issues”—but also destroys their motivation to learn, making “academic burnout” a heavy label on their youth. Some even said, “It’s worse than a prison—just pure exploitation.” These voices laid the groundwork for the eventual collective action.
On November 17, the day the new schedule took effect, hundreds of students gathered in front of the dormitory, chanting “Open the door!” to express their discontent with the school’s prison-like management and to demand access to their rooms. According to students on site, several teachers tried to stop them but failed. In the end, under the pressure of united student action, the school administration made a temporary concession: students were allowed to return to their dorms for lunch break that day, and the school announced that future lunch breaks would also be taken in the dorms.
However, as of November 18, the school has not decided whether it will revise the timetable or reduce study hours. Students say they are still negotiating with the school and hope for a positive outcome.
“Ningbo Baby ‘Little Luoxi’ Dies After Minimally Invasive Surgery; Mother’s Protest Draws Massive Online Support (2025.11.17)”
On the evening of November 17, at Tianyi Square in Haishu District, Ningbo, Ms. Deng — who had lost her infant daughter just one day earlier — recounted to supportive citizens how Little Luoxi passed away, and publicly accused Dr. Chen, director of the cardiology department at Ningbo Women and Children’s Hospital. Over the previous two days, her story had gone viral on social media, drawing tens of millions of views. Many local residents arrived at Tianyi Square after seeing the news online. However, Ms. Deng’s attempt to seek accountability was blocked by the police.
Low-risk minimally invasive surgery goes wrong; 5-month-old baby dies
According to Ms. Deng, her daughter, born prematurely on May 26, 2025, had been growing well under careful family care. During a routine checkup on November 11, doctors discovered atrial septal defects — two secundum holes measuring 3 mm and 7 mm. After researching similar cases, Ms. Deng learned that many children naturally recover after age one. But Dr. Chen insisted surgery should be done early, claiming delayed treatment might affect lung and brain development. He also told the family the procedure was common and low-risk, with only a 1% complication rate and an expected duration of 2.5 to 3 hours.
Little Luoxi underwent surgery at 7:48 a.m. on November 14. However, the operation dragged on far beyond expectations — it still had not concluded by 3 p.m. The family repeatedly called the hospital for updates but received no response. Around 4 p.m., a doctor finally informed them the surgery was “not going very smoothly,” and reluctantly admitted that the chances of survival were “fifty-fifty.” At 4:37 p.m., the baby was wheeled out of the operating room, swollen and covered in tubes, and transferred to the ICU. Although doctors still claimed the procedure had been successful, Ms. Deng immediately sensed that “my daughter was already gone” and requested emergency assistance from partner specialists in Shanghai. The hospital agreed, but according to Ms. Deng, “no Shanghai doctor ever came.” At 10:03 p.m., the hospital pronounced Little Luoxi dead. Ms. Deng described her daughter’s face as severely swollen and darkened, with blood marks and tears still visible.
Family suspects the hospital concealed critical information; attempts to view footage met with force
The family later learned that the initial surgery had actually ended around 1 p.m., but doctors performed a second procedure afterward. By then, Little Luoxi was already in critical condition — yet none of this was disclosed to the family. The total procedure lasted nearly nine hours, with 7 hours and 12 minutes of general anesthesia. The family believes prolonged anesthesia and a second opening of the chest directly led to the baby’s death.
The hospital refused the family’s request to review surgical footage and deployed security staff to forcibly drag them into an area without surveillance cameras. Ms. Deng said she was beaten by security guards. At Tianyi Square, she showed supporters a large bruise on her thigh.
Online support surges as the mother turns to the internet for help
After failing to communicate with the hospital, Ms. Deng turned to social media, posting a detailed account and listing three demands:
The provincial health commission must dispatch an expert team to investigate and disclose the surgical footage and truth behind the incident.
Dr. Chen must publicly apologize so that her daughter may “rest in peace.”
The hospital must announce disciplinary actions against Dr. Chen, including revoking his medical license to prevent future harm.
Her post quickly gained widespread attention. Thousands of users on Weibo, Xiaohongshu, and other platforms amplified her story. Some pointed out that Dr. Chen had been involved in previous incidents; in June, he was accused of causing the death of another one-year-old child, but the hospital allegedly suppressed the case. Others noted that atrial septal defects are common and that holes under 5 mm typically require only observation rather than surgery.
After public pressure, the hospital issues a statement; online posts begin disappearing
On November 17, Ningbo Women and Children’s Hospital announced it had suspended Dr. Chen and opened an investigation, promising to cooperate with the family and address any medical malpractice according to law. The Ningbo Health Commission also stated that the incident had been classified as a “major medical dispute.” Meanwhile, many related posts on social media began disappearing or being restricted.
Liaoning Yingkou Government Arbitrarily Halts Fishing, Suppresses Fishermen; Fishermen Say “The Communist Party Won’t Let People Live” (Nov 15, 2025)
On November 15, in Beihai Village, Gaizhou City, Yingkou, Liaoning Province, fishermen protesting the local government’s “one-size-fits-all” fishing ban and vessel inspection policy were suppressed by police. Videos show that at least four fishermen were taken away.
According to local netizens, following several recent fishing accidents, Yingkou City launched a city-wide fishing safety inspection policy, requiring all vessels to stop fishing for inspection and correction. This “one-size-fits-all” approach immediately triggered strong anger among fishermen.
Fishermen said that a single vessel can cost millions of yuan, and annual expenses for labor, supplies, and nets create enormous financial pressure. Many are heavily in debt. A fishing ban means direct economic losses, even threatening their livelihoods. During the inspection process, enforcement officers arbitrarily fined fishermen, sometimes tens of thousands of yuan, causing great hardship.
Meanwhile, amid widespread layoffs in other industries, the fisheries department hired many new staff to carry out inspections, with few permanent officers involved. Official standards for vessel compliance are unclear, leaving fishermen—many of whom have fished for generations—confused, not to mention the new inspectors. Heavy reliance on inexperienced staff makes inspections full of arbitrariness and uncertainty. Fishermen also questioned why such a massive inspection wasn’t scheduled during the off-season, but instead during the fishing season, showing no regard for their survival.
Not only were protesting villagers suppressed, but online discussions were heavily monitored. Related posts were quickly deleted, and some fishermen even received police warnings. One fisherman angrily said: “This is the Communist Party of China. They won’t let people live.”
「贵州、山西、河南四煤矿工人罢工讨薪（2025.11.01-12）」11月上半月，「昨天」频道共记录到四起煤矿工人罢工事件，引发原因均为欠薪，其中贵州六盘水攀枝花煤矿已经拖欠工资长达一年。这四起煤矿工人讨薪事件分别是：11月1日，贵州省遵义市桐梓县大河煤矿工人罢工讨薪。11月11日，山西省晋中市榆次区坤源煤矿工人罢工讨薪。11月12日，贵州省六盘水市水城区攀枝花煤矿工人罢工讨薪。11月12日，河南省洛阳市新义煤矿工人罢工讨薪。 “Coal Miners Strike for Unpaid Wages in Guizhou, Shanxi, and Henan” In the first half of November, the “Yesterday” channel recorded four coal miner strike incidents, all triggered by unpaid wages. Among them, the Panzhihua Coal Mine in Liupanshui, Guizhou, has reportedly withheld wages for as long as one year. The four wage-protest strikes were as follows: — On November 1, workers at Dahe Coal Mine in Tongzi County, Zunyi City, Guizhou Province went on strike. — On November 11, workers at Kunyuan Coal Mine in Yuci District, Jinzhong City, Shanxi Province staged a strike. — On November 12, workers at Panzhihua Coal Mine in Shuicheng District, Liupanshui City, Guizhou Province went on strike. — Also on November 12, workers at Xinyi Coal Mine in Luoyang City, Henan Province launched a strike.
Chinese Communist Veterans Discarded After Use: Yunnan Soldier Crawls for Subsidy (Nov 1–10, 2025)
Recently, a video from Luliang County, Qujing, Yunnan, has attracted attention online. In it, a militia veteran who fought in the Sino-Vietnamese War is seen kneeling and crawling before government staff and security guards, just to claim a meager monthly subsidy of less than 1,000 yuan.Once hailed by the CCP as “the most lovable people,” these veterans now have to humiliate themselves for a tiny allowance.
These veterans went to the local government on November 1 to demand their rights. They were mobilized by the CCP in 1987, given brief training, and sent to the Sino-Vietnamese front lines. They faced the same life-threatening dangers as regular soldiers, transporting ammunition under fire and repairing fortifications day and night. They ate, lived, and endured harsh conditions alongside the army. Many were injured, and some died on the battlefield.
Yet after the war, they were denied justice. While regular veterans now receive nearly 1,000 yuan per month, these militia veterans are excluded, living in poverty with no support in old age.
The plight of these Sino-Vietnamese War militia veterans reflects the broader struggles of Chinese veterans. Over the years, unresolved policies and hardship have led many veterans to protest repeatedly—and some have even been forced to beg publicly. On September 3, 2025, during the CCP’s grand military parade, dozens of senior veterans staged a sit-in at the Honghe prefecture government, protesting the lack of proper resettlement policies.
Veterans are also a familiar sight outside the National Petition Bureau, where they face “interception,” harassment, and even detention in “black jails.” On September 7, veterans from Luliang, Shanxi, were stopped by plainclothes police just after arriving in Beijing to petition. A few days later, on November 10, over a hundred veterans went to Hengyang, Hunan, demanding local authorities implement resettlement policies.
Even more shocking, in Wuxi, Jiangsu, veteran Shen Aibin—who stood up for justice, helped the weak, and defended his rights—was repeatedly beaten, tortured, and sentenced multiple times, spending years in prison.
These events make it clear: whether militia on the front lines or commissioned veterans, once they no longer serve the CCP’s needs, they can be pushed to society’s margins.
The slogan “One serves, the whole family is honored” inspires recruits with patriotism. But when soldiers return from the battlefield or the barracks, many face “one day in the army, a lifetime in poverty.” Now, the regime these veterans defended with their lives responds with cold policies and ruthless enforcement.
“Hong Kong-Funded Yintu Electric Workers in Guangdong and Jiangxi Strike for Unpaid Wages and Social Insurance (Nov 3–13, 2025)”
Hundreds of workers at the Hong Kong–funded Yintu Electric factory in Shenzhen went on strike again this Thursday (November 13) to protest the company’s failure to pay social insurance contributions. This is the second strike since September. According to workers, Yintu Electric has long suffered from wage arrears and unpaid social insurance, and employees must resort to striking almost every month just to receive their wages and benefits. The latest action was triggered by the company’s failure to pay social insurance for two consecutive months. Videos from the scene show around 200 workers gathering and blocking the factory gate.
Meanwhile, for the same reasons, 300 workers at Yintu Electric’s factory in Ji’an, Jiangxi also launched a strike on November 3, demanding overdue wages and the settlement of unpaid social insurance. As of November 10, the strike was still ongoing. Under pressure from the workers, the company made a promise on that day: it would fully pay the outstanding wages for September on November 14. As for the unpaid social insurance, the initial plan is to make supplementary payments at the end of each month.
Public information shows that Yintu Electric is a subsidiary of Hong Kong Yintu Industrial Co., Ltd. It operates three factories in China—located in Shenzhen (Guangdong), Jiangmen (Guangdong), and Ji’an (Jiangxi).
“Guangdong Huaiji Villagers Clash Fiercely with Forced Land Expropriation Team (Nov 12, 2025)”
On Wednesday, November 12, villagers in Tongguang Village, Lengkeng Town, Huaiji County, Zhaoqing City, Guangdong Province, clashed with a land expropriation team over a piece of collectively owned land that had been secretly sold by the village committee. The standoff lasted from day to night, with multiple clashes breaking out during the confrontation.
According to villagers, the land was secretly sold for the construction of a new road, and the payment had already been embezzled. Villagers only discovered the sale when road construction began. What angered and worried them even more was that the road would serve a large pig farm being built nearby. Villagers fear that once the farm begins operation, the wastewater and foul odor it produces will severely pollute the environment, making Tongguang Village uninhabitable.
Out of concern for their living environment and anger over the land seizure, the villagers launched a protest in August to block the project. On October 17, they intercepted several construction vehicles and clashed with personnel who tried to drive them away. Thanks to the villagers’ persistence, the construction has remained suspended since then.
On November 12, the local government once again sent a large number of personnel into the village to forcibly resume construction. Witnesses said that three buses filled with expropriation workers and two ambulances entered Tongguang Village that day. The workers, carrying shields, formed a human wall to prevent villagers from approaching the site.
Villagers set off fireworks to sound the alarm and called for more people to come and help. Clashes soon erupted. The villagers’ protest tents were torn down, and a female villager was injured. In anger, some villagers threw dirt toward the expropriation team. Although most protesters were women and elderly people, they continued confronting the team until late at night, during which more clashes broke out. Later, the local government deployed large numbers of police to the village in an attempt to suppress the protest by force.
Villagers said they were outnumbered and could not stop the construction, but vowed to continue defending their homeland. One villager posted on social media:
“I’ll keep posting updates about our protest. If one day you no longer see our voices online, it probably means we’ve been taken away.”
The collapse of the “Private Lending Registration Service Center” in Hancheng, Shaanxi, continues to unfold. On Monday, November 10, hundreds of investors gathered again in front of the Hancheng city government, demanding the return of their investments totaling 1.1 billion yuan. The peaceful protest was quickly suppressed by police. Several investors were violently treated, and 10 were arrested on the spot, only being released around 7 p.m.
A government-endorsed scam: from financial innovation to collective trap
The Hancheng Private Lending Registration Service Center was established in June 2014 as a platform to guide private capital toward “transparency” and “standardization.” It was not an ordinary enterprise: the center was led by the Hancheng city government, with then-mayor Zhang Jianzhong heading the leadership team, and two deputy mayors along with officials from the public security, finance, court, and financial bureaus serving as members.
Promoted through local media and government documents, the center was portrayed as a model of official financial reform. The Hancheng Daily described it as offering “risk-free, high-return investment channels” and featured stories of villagers investing their children’s tuition and retirement savings. The government claimed it had “successfully issued over 1 billion yuan in loans with zero bad debts.”
With such high-level backing and promotion, the center’s 8% monthly return plan attracted many citizens. Most investors were retirees, small merchants, or farmers, trusting that “the government supervises it, so the risks are controlled,” with some even selling houses or using retirement savings to invest.
However, what the government called “financial innovation” became a collective disaster. In late September 2025, the center abruptly announced a funding crisis, leading to a total collapse. Statistics show around 2,200 victims were affected, with total losses of approximately 1.1 billion yuan.
The government as both player and referee
After the collapse, the Hancheng city government announced it would “take over” the center and promised a “solution plan,” but no action has been taken to date. When it could not fulfill its promises, authorities resorted to violent suppression of investors.
In this case, the Hancheng government quickly shifted from being the instigator to the “maintainer of order.” While such incidents are not uncommon, this level of brazen involvement is rare. When the government acts as both player and referee, the people are the only victims.
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Owe Wages Worldwide: “Belt and Road” Becomes “Owe and Road” (Nov 5, 2025)
On November 5, news of a strike at the Simandou iron mine project in Guinea quickly drew attention from Chinese overseas workers worldwide. Reports indicated that Shanxi Construction Investment, the project contractor, had long withheld wages from Chinese workers, forcing them to work unpaid for three consecutive months. Eventually, the workers staged a strike and blocked roads to demand payment.
After workers uploaded videos and information online, Chinese laborers from Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe quickly responded, sharing their own experiences of unpaid wages on similar projects. These scattered accounts reveal a shocking and long-ignored reality: wage arrears by Chinese state-owned enterprises worldwide are becoming systematic and normalized.
According to incomplete statistics, reported cases of unpaid wages span five continents—Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and Oceania—and involve fourteen countries, including Guinea, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Belarus, and Cambodia. Companies accused of withholding wages include the backbone of China’s overseas infrastructure investment: China Railway Group, China State Construction, China Hydropower, PetroChina, Sinopec, PowerChina, China Metallurgical Group, China National Earthquake Engineering, and Shanxi Construction Investment. Workers have been left unpaid for months, sometimes over half a year.
For more than a decade, China has promoted the “Belt and Road Initiative” as a national-level strategy to showcase its international influence and development vision. In reality, however, many projects fall far short of their initial promises, with some halted or left unfinished. Italy, the Philippines, and Panama have even withdrawn from related projects.
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Chinese overseas workers are increasingly vulnerable. They build railways, dams, and roads in foreign countries, performing the hardest labor. When projects stall due to financial crises or political instability, these workers are often the first to be abandoned. They cannot collect their hard-earned wages and are frequently prevented by companies—or even local authorities—from seeking help online under the pretext of “protecting national image” or “understanding national difficulties.” Any attempt to speak out online is met with threats and suppression, and posts are often deleted within hours.
These Chinese state-owned enterprises also withhold wages from local workers. However, local laborers are generally protected by national laws and labor unions and are less vulnerable than Chinese workers. Delaying their pay is more likely to provoke strikes or even violent conflict. As a result, Chinese workers’ wages are more easily withheld.
Today, in China’s official narrative, the “Belt and Road” is rarely mentioned. The initiative, once promoted as a “modern Silk Road,” is increasingly turning into a route defined by unfinished projects and unpaid wages—a true “Owe and Road.”
