「瘟神来了：黑龙江百万商户非暴力不合作抗争运动（2026.04—06）」2026年4月至6月，中国东北部的黑龙江省持续爆发了一场规模空前的“非暴力不合作”运动。根据“昨天”项目统计，在4月25日至6月30日的67天内，黑龙江省34个县（市、区）的商户先后集体关门罢市，累计参与商户超过百万人。这场行动没有公开的组织者，没有统一的号召，也没有明确的领导人物，却依靠商户之间长期形成的默契不断扩散，成为近年来中国持续时间最长、覆盖范围最广的集体抗争行动之一。与此同时，面对这样一场“去中心化”的大规模运动，中共当局几乎束手无策，只能眼睁睁看着罢市浪潮蔓延。

序幕

这场运动最早出现在黑龙江省绥化市西南部的一个小县城。2026年4月25日，绥化市青冈县全县商户突然集体关门停业，没有人公开说明原因，官方也未作解释。一天后，紧邻青冈县的望奎县商户也相继集体罢市。两地罢市均持续约三天后结束，却由此拉开了一场大规模“非暴力不合作”抗争运动的序幕。

升级

5月12日，沉寂十余天后，距青冈县约300公里外的讷河市，也出现了全城商户集体关门停业现象。随后十余天内，运动开始跨地区扩散。5月23日至29日的一周内，齐齐哈尔地区的拜泉县、依安县、克东县、克山县、富裕县等地商户相继加入。

进入6月，在经历4月、5月的零星扩散后，这场运动迎来全面爆发。6月3日至16日，绥化地区首先形成连片蔓延：北林区、安达市、肇东市、兰西县、青冈县、庆安县等地先后出现商户集体停业。紧接着，大庆市萨尔图区、让胡路区、龙凤区、红岗区、大同区以及林甸县、杜尔伯特蒙古族自治县也加入其中。

6月17日起，齐齐哈尔市迎来集中爆发。短短两天内，泰来县、龙江县、甘南县、昂昂溪区、梅里斯达斡尔族区、富拉尔基区、龙沙区、铁锋区、建华区等几乎覆盖全市的多个县区同时出现商户集体关门，形成此次运动中规模最大的区域性爆发。齐齐哈尔作为黑龙江省第二大城市，其市区及下辖县市几乎全部卷入罢市浪潮，这在近年来中国的集体行动中极为罕见。

与此同时，大庆市肇州县商户从6月17日起持续停业至6月23日，黑河嫩江市于6月20日加入，肇源县随后也连续两天出现商户集体罢市。

6月下旬，运动继续向绥化地区扩散。海伦市、绥棱县连续多日反复停业，部分地区甚至出现“开一天、关一天”的循环状态。6月30日，随着绥化市下属的绥棱县商户最后一次集体关门，此次大规模不合作运动暂告一段落。

至此，黑龙江已有34个县（市、区）先后出现商户集体停业，涉及绥化、齐齐哈尔、大庆、黑河四个地级市。

瘟神来了

那么，究竟是什么原因，让黑龙江多地商户在没有统一组织、没有公开号召的情况下，突然一地接一地关门停业？答案就在当地部分商户口中的“瘟神”两个字里。

据大量当地商户和网友透露，这场运动的直接起因，是商户之间传出的据称是来自体制内部的消息：政府联合检查组即将对辖区内的商店、超市、餐饮店等开展集中检查。检查本身并不罕见，商户为何要大面积关门躲避？原因是长期以来，政府部门经常以消防、安全、卫生、市场监管等名义开展集中检查，并开出数额较高的罚单。一次处罚少则数千元、上万元，多则数万元甚至十万元以上。对许多小商户而言，一年辛苦经营所得，甚至不足以支付一次罚款。在过去的经济繁荣时期，被罚款后尚能靠后续经营慢慢补回来。但当前经济低迷，不少商户本就在盈亏边缘挣扎，一旦遭遇高额罚款，几乎等同于被判”死刑”。

至于检查“合格”的标准究竟是什么，官方说不清楚，商户也不明白，但只要检查人员进入店铺，总能找到各种理由进行处罚。消防通道、食品摆放、卫生细节、证照手续、货品标签，任何一个细节都可能成为罚款理由。

这种不确定性令商户人心惶惶，一些商户甚至表示，检查组比新冠病毒还厉害，只要看见有人神情严肃地在街上走动，就会怀疑对方是检查组成员。因此，一旦商户之间传出”将有检查”的消息，越来越多人便选择主动停业数日以规避风险，只要一家有风吹草动，附近店铺往往会立刻齐刷刷关门。对商户而言，几天没有收入尚可承受，但一旦被罚款，往往是灭顶之灾。

 这场风波波及的不只是商户。由于大量店铺同时停业，普通市民的日常生活也受到影响：餐饮暂停营业、蔬菜和生活用品购买不便，理发等日常服务也难以获得。不少市民在网络上抱怨，临时买不到菜、找不到开门的理发店，生活节奏被迫打乱。 有市民疑问，当局为什么不用这种方式去解决食品安全、医疗问题、贪污腐败等问题。出于对检查人员的恐惧与厌恶，当地民众给检查组取了外号”瘟神”。

无款可罚，当局紧急“辟谣”

由于商户集体停业，检查人员难以像以往一样进入店铺寻找理由开具高额罚单，不少检查行动最终无功而返。为了促使商户恢复营业，各地政府陆续发布公告“辟谣”，一些地方甚至出动宣传车辆沿街广播，称网络流传的“商户被处以巨额罚款”等信息“不属实”，并强调政府并未开展任何形式的全市大检查。然而，对于早已失去公信力的官方而言，这些声明并未打消商户疑虑，反而进一步加剧了他们的不信任，许多商户因此继续选择关门歇业。

事实上，在此次运动期间，仍有部分商户因相信了官方公告而恢复营业，但很快，他们就为此付出了代价。据当地流传的消息，罚款金额从数万元到十余万元不等。部分处罚理由甚至仅是店内发现三个变质土豆，或摆放了一个烟灰缸。对此，不少市民调侃称：“这是财政紧张下来集资了”“收钱来了，纯收钱。”

去中心、非暴力、不合作：一种新的集体行动模式

67天里，这场没有统一组织、没有公开领袖的集体行动，依靠商户彼此之间长期以来形成的默契，以及相互之间的信息传播和效仿不断扩散，最终蔓延至黑龙江34个市、县、区，形成了一场典型的”非暴力不合作”运动。对于大多数参与者而言，停业最初只是为了规避检查、避免高额罚款，是一种出于自身利益的经营选择；但当越来越多商户作出相同决定时，分散的个体行为便汇聚成了一场参与人数超过百万的大规模集体行动。

这场运动能够持续两个多月，一个重要原因就在于它没有固定的组织形态，也使当局难以像处理传统群体事件那样迅速终止行动。长期以来，中共当局应对群体事件，通常依赖寻找组织者、切断联络网络、约谈带头人，通过瓦解组织来终结行动。但这场运动自始至终没有公开发起人，没有统一联络渠道，也没有共同发布的诉求。每一家商户是否停业，在形式上都只是各自作出的经营决定。面对不断蔓延的罢市潮，当局既找不到可以抓捕的组织者，也没有联络网络可以切断，更难将一场没有集会、没有口号、没有组织架构的广泛停业行动纳入既有的处置模式。运动期间，当局能够采取的措施，主要是发布辟谣公告、组织宣传车辆沿街广播、劝导商户恢复营业，但作用有限。

这一现象尤其值得关注，因为它发生在中国维稳体系不断强化的背景下。近年来，从网格化管理、人脸识别、大数据预警，到社交媒体监控、重点人员稳控，各类维稳和社会控制手段不断升级。在这样的环境下，依赖组织、串联和公开集会的大规模集体抗争越来越难以形成和持续。“昨天”项目及其前身“非新闻”的数据统计也印证了这一趋势：与十年前相比，中国大规模民间抗争事件的数量和规模均出现了明显下降。

相比之下，”避瘟神”运动几乎没有依赖这些容易被识别的要素。参与者之间无需建立组织，也没有固定集会地点，更没有统一的诉求文件。运动的扩散主要依赖商户之间长期形成的默契，以及对共同处境的判断和效仿，而不是正式的组织动员。正因如此，现有维稳体系中许多针对组织化行动设计的应对方式，在这场运动中都难以发挥预期作用。

在大规模游行、联署请愿和组织化抗争越来越困难的情况下，这种以”不合作”为核心、依靠个体自主决定不断扩散的行动方式，值得关注。它的参与门槛很低，商户只需选择不开门营业，不需要公开身份，也无需承担组织者的风险。它的传播同样难以阻断，因为推动更多人加入的并不是统一号召，而是相似处境下不断重复出现的共同选择。

当然，去中心化行动也存在明显局限。由于缺乏统一组织和代表机制，参与者难以形成一致诉求，也难以与政府展开正式协商。运动能持续多久，很大程度上取决于现实压力是否仍然存在。一旦检查减少、商户恢复营业，行动往往也会自然消散，而难以继续围绕基层执法、罚没制度等更深层问题形成长期压力。

但在当前环境下，这种局限恰恰也是它能够持续存在的重要原因。没有组织者，就难以实施”定点打击”；没有统一诉求，也就缺少可以集中压制的目标。从这个意义上说，”避瘟神”运动展示的或许不仅是一场商户集体停业事件，更是一种在高压环境下逐渐形成的行动方式：当组织化抗争的空间不断收缩，人们仍然可以通过彼此独立、却高度一致的选择，表达共同的不满。

如果说过去的中国社会运动更多依赖组织动员和街头集结，那么黑龙江商户运动所展现的，则是一种建立在共同利益、自发传播和非暴力不合作基础上的去中心化集体行动。这种模式是否会被更多群体借鉴，还有待观察；但它已经为理解当代中国社会集体行动的变化，提供了一个值得关注的新案例。

“The Plague God Cometh: A Million Merchants’ Nonviolent Noncooperation Movement in Heilongjiang (April–June 2026)”

From April to June 2026, China’s northeastern province of Heilongjiang saw an unprecedented wave of “nonviolent noncooperation.” According to figures compiled by the “Yesterday” project, over 67 days between April 25 and June 30, merchants in 34 counties, cities, and districts across the province collectively shuttered their businesses, with total participation exceeding one million. The movement had no public organizers, no unified call to action, and no identifiable leadership, yet it spread through longstanding tacit understanding among merchants, becoming one of the longest-running and most geographically extensive collective actions in China in recent years. Facing this decentralized, large-scale movement, Chinese Communist Party authorities proved largely powerless, left to watch the wave of closures spread unchecked.

Prelude

The movement first surfaced in a small county in southwestern Suihua, Heilongjiang. On April 25, merchants across Qing’an County shut their doors in unison, with no public explanation offered by anyone and no official comment forthcoming. A day later, merchants in neighboring Wangkui County followed suit. Both closures lasted roughly three days, but they marked the opening act of what would become a large-scale campaign of nonviolent noncooperation.

Escalation

After a lull of more than ten days, on May 12 merchants in Nehe, roughly 300 kilometers from Qing’an County, closed en masse citywide. Over the following two weeks, the movement began spreading across regions. Between May 23 and 29, merchants in Baiquan, Yi’an, Kedong, Keshan, and Fuyu counties in the Qiqihar area joined one after another.

By June, following the sporadic spread of April and May, the movement erupted in full. From June 3 to 16, closures first swept across the Suihua region in succession — Beilin District, Anda, Zhaodong, Lanxi County, Qing’an County again, and Qing’an County. Da­qing’s Sartu, Ranghulu, Longfeng, Honggang, and Datong districts, along with Lindian and Dorbod Mongol Autonomous Counties, soon joined as well.

Starting June 17, Qiqihar saw a concentrated outbreak. Within two days, merchants across Tailai, Longjiang, Gannan, Ang’angxi, Meilisi Daur, Fularji, Longsha, Tiefeng, and Jianhua — nearly every county and district in the city — shut down simultaneously, forming the largest regional surge of the entire movement. As Heilongjiang’s second-largest city, nearly all of Qiqihar’s urban districts and subordinate counties were swept into the wave of closures, a scale rarely seen in Chinese collective action in recent years.

Meanwhile, merchants in Daqing’s Zhaozhou County remained closed continuously from June 17 to 23; Nenjiang City in Heihe joined on June 20; and Zhaoyuan County saw two consecutive days of collective closures shortly after.

In late June, the movement continued spreading through the Suihua region. Hailun and Suileng County saw repeated closures over several days, with some areas cycling between opening one day and closing the next. On June 30, merchants in Suileng County closed their doors for the final time, bringing this large-scale noncooperation campaign to a temporary halt.

By that point, merchants across 34 counties, cities, and districts in Heilongjiang had collectively shut down at various points, spanning four prefecture-level cities: Suihua, Qiqihar, Daqing, and Heihe.

The Plague God Cometh

What, then, caused merchants across so many parts of Heilongjiang to shut their doors one place after another, with no unified organization and no public call to action? The answer lies in a term some local merchants use: “the plague god” (瘟神).

According to numerous local merchants and internet users, the movement’s direct trigger was word spreading among merchants — reportedly originating from inside the system — that a joint government inspection team was about to conduct sweeping checks of shops, supermarkets, and restaurants across the district. Inspections themselves are nothing new, so why did merchants close en masse to avoid them? The reason lies in a long-standing pattern: government departments frequently conduct centralized inspections under the banners of fire safety, security, hygiene, and market regulation, then issue steep fines. A single penalty can run from several thousand to tens of thousands of yuan, and sometimes more than 100,000 yuan. For many small merchants, a fine like that can exceed an entire year’s earnings. During times of economic prosperity, merchants could recoup a fine through continued business over time. But with the economy now in a downturn, many merchants are already operating on the edge of profitability, and a single steep fine amounts to a death sentence for their business.

As for what actually counts as “passing” an inspection, officials cannot say and merchants do not understand — but once inspectors are inside a shop, they can always find some pretext for a fine. Fire exits, how food is displayed, hygiene details, licensing paperwork, product labeling: any single detail can become grounds for a penalty.

This uncertainty has left merchants on edge. Some say the inspection teams are more fearsome than COVID-19 — the mere sight of someone walking down the street with a serious expression is enough to raise suspicion that they might be an inspector. As a result, whenever word spreads that inspections are coming, more and more merchants choose to close preemptively for several days to avoid the risk; once one shop shows any sign of trouble, nearby stores tend to shut their doors in unison almost immediately. For merchants, losing a few days’ income is bearable — but a fine is often ruinous.

The fallout extends beyond merchants themselves. With so many shops closed at once, ordinary residents’ daily lives have also been disrupted: restaurants shut down, buying vegetables and household goods becomes difficult, and everyday services like haircuts become hard to find. Many residents have complained online about being unable to buy groceries or find an open barbershop, their routines thrown into disarray. Some have asked why authorities can’t apply this same swift efficiency to problems like food safety, healthcare, and corruption. Out of fear and resentment toward the inspectors, local residents have taken to calling the inspection teams “the plague god.”

Nothing Left to Fine, Authorities Rush to “Set the Record Straight”

With merchants shut down en masse, inspectors have found it difficult to enter shops and find pretexts for steep fines as they once did, and many inspection efforts have come away empty-handed. In an effort to get merchants to reopen, local governments have issued a series of public notices “debunking rumors,” with some areas even dispatching loudspeaker trucks to broadcast along the streets that online reports of merchants facing massive fines are “untrue,” insisting no citywide inspection campaign was underway. But for authorities who had already lost public credibility, these statements failed to ease merchants’ doubts — and in fact deepened their distrust, prompting many to keep their doors closed.

Indeed, during the movement some merchants who believed the official notices did reopen for business — and quickly paid the price. According to accounts circulating locally, fines ranged from tens of thousands to more than 100,000 yuan. Some penalties were reportedly issued over grounds as trivial as three spoiled potatoes found in a shop or a single ashtray left out. Many residents have mocked the fines online, saying it looks like the government is short on cash and “fundraising,” or bluntly, “just collecting money, pure and simple.”

Decentralized, Nonviolent, Noncooperative: A New Model of Collective Action

Over 67 days, this collective action — with no unified organization and no public leader — spread through longstanding tacit understanding among merchants, along with the circulation of information and mutual imitation, eventually reaching 34 cities, counties, and districts across Heilongjiang and forming a textbook case of “nonviolent noncooperation.” For most participants, closing shop began as a simple act of self-interest — avoiding inspections and steep fines. But as more and more merchants made the same choice, these scattered individual decisions coalesced into a mass collective action involving more than a million people.

One key reason the movement lasted more than two months is precisely that it had no fixed organizational structure, making it difficult for authorities to shut down the way they typically handle mass incidents. For years, the Party’s standard approach to mass incidents has relied on identifying organizers, cutting off communication networks, and summoning ringleaders for “talks” — dismantling the organization to end the action. But this movement had no public initiator from start to finish, no unified communication channel, and no jointly issued demands. Whether any given shop closed was, in form, simply an individual business decision. Faced with a spreading wave of closures, authorities found no organizers to arrest and no network to sever, and struggled to fit a widespread shutdown with no rallies, no slogans, and no organizational structure into their existing playbook. The main measures authorities could take during the movement were issuing notices debunking rumors, dispatching loudspeaker trucks, and urging merchants to reopen — all with limited effect.

This phenomenon is especially notable because it unfolded against the backdrop of an ever-tightening stability-maintenance apparatus in China. In recent years, grid-style social management, facial recognition, big-data early-warning systems, social media surveillance, and the close monitoring of “key individuals” have all intensified. In such an environment, large-scale collective resistance that depends on organization, coordination, and public assembly has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Data compiled by the “Yesterday” project and its predecessor, “Not the News,” bear this out: compared with a decade ago, both the number and scale of large-scale civil protests in China have declined markedly.

By contrast, the “avoiding the plague god” movement relied on almost none of these easily identifiable elements. Participants needed no organization among themselves, no fixed assembly point, and no unified list of demands. The movement spread mainly through longstanding tacit understanding among merchants and shared judgment of a common situation, rather than through formal organizational mobilization. As a result, many of the responses the stability-maintenance system has developed for organized action found little purchase against this movement.

At a time when large-scale marches, joint petitions, and organized resistance have all grown more difficult, this mode of action — centered on “noncooperation” and spreading through individual, autonomous decisions — deserves attention. Its barrier to entry is low: merchants need only choose not to open their doors; they need not reveal their identities or take on the risks of being an organizer. It is equally hard to stop, since what draws more people in is not a unified call but the same choice repeatedly made under similar circumstances.

Of course, decentralized action has clear limitations. Without unified organization or representation, participants struggle to form a common set of demands or enter into formal negotiation with the government. How long such a movement lasts depends largely on whether the underlying pressure persists. Once inspections ease and merchants reopen, the action tends to dissipate on its own, unable to sustain long-term pressure around deeper issues such as grassroots law enforcement or the fining system itself.

But in the current environment, this very limitation may be what allows the movement to endure. Without organizers, there is no one to target for a “targeted strike”; without unified demands, there is no single objective to suppress. In this sense, the “avoiding the plague god” movement may represent more than a single episode of merchants shutting their doors — it points to a mode of action gradually taking shape under high-pressure conditions: as space for organized resistance keeps shrinking, people can still express shared grievances through choices made independently yet in striking un

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Thousands in Hefei March to Block Garbage Plant, Clash With Police (2026.06.27)

Thousands of residents in Luyang District, Hefei, Anhui Province, took to the streets on Saturday night to protest a planned large-scale garbage transfer station, forcing local officials to announce on the spot that the project would be canceled. During the demonstration, residents clashed violently with police, and several protesters were taken into custody.

纪录片「重庆事件：中国民间反虐待动物第一枪」2026年6月初，中国西南重镇重庆爆发了一场罕见的动物保护抗议行动。数以千计的网友和动保志愿者连续数日集会，抗议一名残忍虐杀犬只的男子，并呼吁推动中国《反虐待动物法》立法。抗议期间，参与者多次遭到公安暴力镇压，但仍凭着坚韧的意志，冒着巨大风险坚持了5天。这场由年轻人、女性为抗争主体的行动虽未能实现诉求，却开创了中国民间大规模动保示威的先例，引发广泛社会关注，并将相关事件传播至国际社会。

“重庆事件”爆发后，当局开动审查机器，疯狂删帖。“昨天”项目通过连日“抢救”出来的500余现场视频，制作了这个近两个小时的记录片，记录下这段历史。感谢所有在现场的抗争者、视频拍摄者以及投稿网友。

Documentary: “The Chongqing Incident: China’s First Major Civilian Anti-Animal Cruelty Protest”

In early June 2026, a rare animal-protection protest broke out in Chongqing, a major city in southwestern China. Thousands of internet users and animal-welfare volunteers gathered for several consecutive days to protest a man accused of brutally killing dogs and to call for legislation of an Anti-Animal Cruelty Law in China. During the demonstrations, participants were repeatedly subjected to violent police suppression, yet they continued to resist for five days despite the significant risks involved. Although the movement did not achieve its demands, this youth- and female-led campaign set a precedent for large-scale grassroots animal-protection demonstrations in China, attracted widespread public attention, and brought the incident to international awareness.

After the “Chongqing incident” erupted, the authorities launched a sweeping censorship campaign and aggressively deleted online posts. Drawing on more than 500 on-site videos that the “Yesterday” project managed to rescue and preserve over several days, we produced this nearly two-hour documentary to record this chapter of history. Our thanks go to all the protesters, videographers, and contributors who were present at the scene.

下载地址：https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1J9DYf506gwy_1kB3eO2gYXdwQ79WdZVb?usp=sharing

「中国第二大扶贫安置区爆发大规模抗议：上千村民与警冲突围堵警车（2026.05.07）」5月7日，在中国规模第二大的跨县易地扶贫搬迁安置点——云南省昭通市鲁甸县卯家湾安置区，因街道与物业强行收取停车费，引发数以千计的村民集体抗议。抗议活动在当天升级为冲突，现场一度陷入混乱，一辆特警车被长时间围困，至少一名村民在冲突中受伤。迫于持续升级的民怨压力，地方政府最终宣布暂停相关收费。

起因

卯家湾安置区是中国“易地扶贫搬迁”政策最具代表性的项目之一，共安置来自鲁甸、巧家等五个贫困县的3.9万余名村民。官方长期将其宣传为“脱贫攻坚样板工程”，旨在将乌蒙山区高海拔、交通闭塞地区的贫困人口整体迁入城区集中安置。然而，现实生活并未如官方宣传般改善，一些村民反而陷入新的困境。来到城市后，这些原本依靠土地维生的农民，却失去了最基本的生产资料。由于缺乏稳定工作和技能，大量家庭长期只能依靠打零工、低保或临时收入维持生活。与此同时，物业费、水电费、保险、教育等城市生活成本却不断增加，一家人省吃俭用，开销一年也要15000元左右。一些村民甚至开始怀念过去的农村生活，希望返回老家。但当年的村庄和住房早已在“扶贫搬迁”“改善生活”的名义下被摧毁，他们已经失去了退路。一名村民表示：“来这里没有地可以种，好多搬来比原来更穷了，在农村至少吃喝不要钱，有地种菜种粮食，不用交物业费。”

在这样的背景下，当地社区和物业却突然宣布，今年5月起将对小区车辆收取每月360元的停车费。这一决定迅速点燃长期积累的不满情绪。对于许多本就收入微薄的搬迁户而言，这笔费用已成为难以承受的额外负担。更令村民愤怒的是，长期以来，小区房屋漏水、设施损坏等问题迟迟无人维修，物业却经常以“一些人未缴物业费”为由拒绝处理。如今在无法出示明确收费依据及主管部门正式文件的情况下，又突然加收停车费，被大量居民质疑是在“借扶贫安置区敛财”。一名村民在社交媒体上愤怒表示：“说实话我们搬家的好多吃饭都有点恼火，上有老下有小，现在工作不好找，一年开支也不少，当时不搬的时候当地政府组织人把老家房子挖，去挖房子的时候还把120叫上，现在我们搬了，如今又要收物业费，停车费，卫生费等等费用，没有一个稳定的工作怎么交，好不容易找到活干，最后还拿不到钱，一天推一天，让我们怎么过，如果真的有，我们百姓也会交。”

抗争

收费决定一经推出，随即引发多个片区村民连日抗议。5月6日，三号地块爆发了警民对峙：当局出动警察试图强行拖走抗议车辆，村民则集体站上拖车阻拦，致使行动受挫。

冲突

5月7日中午，矛盾在二号地块彻底激化。在一些村民驾车进入小区受阻后，上千名村民陆续聚集至小区大门处抗议。当局迅速调集特警到场压制，双方爆发了冲突，一名村民头部受伤出血。之后，打人警察躲进警车，愤怒的人群随即将特警车团团围住，阻止其离开。

官方让步，抗争取得初步胜利。

当日下午，面对村民的怒火，一名政府官员通过喇叭公开作出三项承诺：立即撤除物业道闸，所有车辆自由进出，并由公安副局长负责监督；即日起暂停停车费及物业费的征收工作；成立专项工作组，逐社区召开群众会议，收集生产、生活、就业及物业管理等方面的意见。之后，村民才陆续散去。

过去多年，这类项目常被官方包装为“脱贫奇迹”和政治政绩，但在实际操作中，许多搬迁居民不仅失去了土地和原有生计，也未真正获得稳定就业与社会保障。部分地方政府更是借此敛财，以物业、停车、管理等名义不断增加收费，使本就脆弱的搬迁家庭苦不堪言。

Massive Protest Erupts in China’s Second-Largest Poverty Alleviation Resettlement Zone: Thousands Clash with Police, Besiege Police Vehicle (2026.05.07)

On May 7, a massive protest involving thousands of residents broke out in the Maojiawan Resettlement Area in Ludian County, Zhaotong City, Yunnan Province—the second-largest cross-county poverty alleviation resettlement site in China. The unrest was triggered by the forced imposition of parking fees by local street authorities and property management.

The protest escalated into a violent confrontation, resulting in a chaotic scene where a SWAT vehicle was besieged for an extended period and at least one villager was injured. Under the pressure of escalating public outcry, the local government eventually announced a suspension of the fees.

The Root Cause

The Maojiawan Resettlement Area is a flagship project of China’s “Relocation from Inhospitable Areas” policy, housing over 39,000 residents from five impoverished counties, including Ludian and Qiaojia. Long touted by officials as a “model project for poverty alleviation,” it aimed to move populations from high-altitude, isolated regions of the Wumeng Mountains into centralized urban settlements.

However, reality has not lived up to the propaganda. Many farmers, who previously relied on the land, found themselves without basic means of production upon arriving in the city. Lacking stable jobs and urban skills, many families now subsist on odd jobs, social security, or temporary income. Meanwhile, the cost of living—including property fees, utilities, insurance, and education—has surged. A typical family now spends approximately 15,000 RMB per year despite living frugally.

Some villagers have expressed a desire to return to their original homes, but those villages and houses were long ago demolished under the banner of “improving lives,” leaving them with no way back. One villager remarked:

“There is no land to farm here. Many of us are poorer than before. In the countryside, at least food and drink were free; we had land for vegetables and grain and no property fees.”

In this fragile economic state, the local community and property management suddenly announced that starting in May, a monthly parking fee of 360 RMB would be charged. For households already struggling with meager incomes, this was the breaking point. Adding to the fury is the fact that property management has consistently ignored issues like leaking roofs and broken facilities, often citing “unpaid property fees” as an excuse, yet they moved forward with new charges without providing legal basis or official government documentation.

The Resistance

The announcement triggered days of protests across several sectors. On May 6, a standoff occurred in “Plot 3” when authorities sent police to forcibly tow away protesting vehicles. Villagers blocked the tow trucks by standing on them, successfully halting the operation.

The Conflict

The situation reached a breaking point at noon on May 7 in “Plot 2.” After some villagers were blocked from driving into the complex, thousands gathered at the main gate. SWAT teams were deployed to suppress the crowd, leading to a physical clash that left one villager with a bleeding head wound. The officer involved reportedly retreated into a police vehicle, which was then surrounded by the angry crowd, preventing it from leaving the scene.

Government Concession

By that afternoon, facing intense public anger, a government official made three public promises via megaphone:

1. Immediate removal of property gates to allow free entry and exit for all vehicles, supervised by the Deputy Bureau Chief of Public Security.
2. Immediate suspension of all parking and property fee collections.
3. Formation of a special task force to hold community meetings and collect feedback on production, living conditions, employment, and property management.

Following these concessions, the crowds began to disperse.

Analysis

For years, such projects have been packaged as “poverty alleviation miracles” and political achievements. However, in practice, many relocated residents have not only lost their land and traditional livelihoods but have also failed to secure stable employment or social safety nets. In some regions, local governments and management companies have been accused of using these zones as “cash cows,” imposing various fees that push already vulnerable families to the brink.

「玩具巨头华盛同日关闭广西四家工厂，5000工人连日集会索赔（2026.04.22-23）」2026年4月20日，广西”三月三”假期结束后的首个工作日，港资玩具代工巨头华盛玩具旗下四家广西工厂：容县华耀玩具制造有限公司、北流华盛盈峰玩具制造有限公司、北流万峰玩具有限公司、北流创峰塑胶电子制品有限公司，同日宣告倒闭，近万名工人骤然失业。此后两日，工人连续发起维权行动，要求公司结清欠薪、依法足额赔偿，但截至4月22日下午，仍未取得任何实质进展。

公司声明回避具体标准

在向员工发出的停业通知中，华盛将此次关厂归因于外部经济环境。公司称，近年来中美关税贸易摩擦持续加剧，海外经营环境持续恶化，公司被产品终端海外客户拖欠巨额货款，导致资金链断裂，自即日起正式停止所有经营业务。公司虽在通知中声称将”优先保障员工工资、经济补偿金等法定权益”。却对具体赔偿标准、金额及时间节点均未作任何说明。工人们对此高度警惕，就在不久前，华盛对另外一家旗下工厂的失业工人，只勉强给出了“0.5N”的赔偿。而按中国《劳动法》规定，华盛最少也要按“N+1”标准赔偿。

不按规赔偿早有先例

华盛玩具1976年创立于香港，1981年首次进入中国内地设厂。四十余年间，先后在广东、广西及越南开设共11家工厂，总厂区面积逾200万平方米，员工约两万人，规模位居全球玩具代工前列。然而，近年来，随着贸易环境持续恶化、订单不断萎缩，华盛实际已陷入连年亏损。2025年底：同属华盛旗下、拥有26年历史的东莞长荣玩具厂，因订单暴跌而宣告结业。彼时，公司拒绝依劳动法标准足额赔偿工人，引发工人连日维权，最终以“法定标准打五折”赔偿草草了结。长荣案例的前车之鉴，令广西工人清醒的认识到：在当前就业市场持续萎缩的背景下，工厂一关，再找一份同等待遇的工作几乎是奢望。他们所能依靠的，只有走上街头，用自己的抗争换取一个公正的说法。

连日维权，当局介入

4月21日上午，除万峰玩具以外的三家工厂约5000名工人分别发起维权行动。在容县华耀厂和北流盈峰厂，工人们分别阻断了工厂外的道路交通，希望引起社会关注。盈峰厂的部分工人还登上了厂房的楼顶，展示了三面巨大的横幅。而在北流创峰厂，工人们除了集会外，还在厂房外打出横幅：”青春全献给华盛，破产别破良心债，还我血汗钱。” 在北流和容县，当局均出动了警察到现场驱逐维权工人，但未引发冲突。22日，工人继续维权，据悉，玉林市一名副市长已介入，但截至当天下午，工人的维权行动仍未取得任何实质性进展。

近年来，随着经济的持续下行，中国的大批工厂接连倒下，而承受最惨重代价的，始终是那些流水线上的普通工人。

Toy Giant Wah Shing Shutters Four Guangxi Factories in One Day; 5,000 Workers Rally for Compensation (2026.04.22–23)

On April 20, 2026 — the first workday after Guangxi’s “March Third” holiday — four Guangxi factories under Hong Kong toy manufacturing giant Wah Shing Toys simultaneously announced their closure: Rongxian Huayao Toy Manufacturing Co., Ltd., Beiliu Wah Shing Yingfeng Toy Manufacturing Co., Ltd., Beiliu Wanfeng Toys Co., Ltd., and Beiliu Chuangfeng Plastic & Electronics Co., Ltd. Nearly ten thousand workers were left jobless overnight. For two consecutive days, workers staged protests demanding full payment of owed wages and legally mandated severance, but as of the afternoon of April 22, no substantive progress had been made.

Company Statement Sidesteps Specifics

In the closure notice issued to employees, Wah Shing attributed the shutdown to the external economic environment. The company stated that escalating US-China tariff tensions in recent years had caused overseas business conditions to deteriorate sharply, with end clients withholding enormous sums in unpaid orders, ultimately causing a cash flow collapse. All business operations were to cease with immediate effect. While the notice claimed the company would “prioritize employees’ statutory rights, including wages and severance pay,” it provided no details whatsoever on compensation standards, amounts, or timelines. Workers were deeply alarmed: not long ago, Wah Shing had offered workers at another of its closed factories a payout of just 0.5N — half the legal minimum. Under China’s Labor Law, the company is required to pay at minimum the N+1 standard.

A Track Record of Shortchanging Workers

Wah Shing Toys was founded in Hong Kong in 1976 and first established factories in mainland China in 1981. Over more than four decades, it opened 11 factories across Guangdong, Guangxi, and Vietnam, with a total floor area exceeding two million square meters and a workforce of around twenty thousand, ranking among the world’s largest toy contract manufacturers. In recent years, however, as the trade environment worsened and orders continued to shrink, Wah Shing had in fact been running losses year after year. In late 2025, Changrong Toy Factory in Dongguan — a 26-year-old Wah Shing subsidiary — announced its closure after orders plummeted. At the time, the company refused to pay workers the full compensation required by law, triggering days of protests, and the dispute was ultimately settled at just half the legally mandated amount. With the Changrong case as a stark warning, Guangxi workers understood clearly: in a job market that keeps shrinking, once a factory closes, finding comparable work again is nearly impossible. Taking to the streets was the only option left — to fight for a just outcome.

Days of Protest, Authorities Step In

On the morning of April 21, around 5,000 workers from three of the four factories — all except Wanfeng Toys — launched separate protest actions. At Rongxian Huayao and Beiliu Yingfeng, workers blocked the roads outside the factories to draw public attention. Some workers at Yingfeng also climbed onto the factory rooftop and unfurled three large banners. At Beiliu Chuangfeng, workers gathered and hung banners outside the factory reading: “We gave our youth to Wah Shing — don’t go bankrupt on your conscience. Pay us what we’re owed.” In both Beiliu and Rongxian, authorities deployed police to disperse the protesters, but no clashes were reported. On the 22nd, workers continued their demonstrations. A Yulin city vice-mayor was reported to have stepped in to mediate, but as of that afternoon, the workers’ efforts had still yielded no substantive results.

As China’s economy continues its prolonged decline, factories across the country have been shutting down one after another. And those who bear the heaviest cost are always the ordinary workers on the assembly line.

「西安数百出租车司机集会要求降费，高喊“无良政府”（2026.04.13）」近年来，受网约车及共享单车等多重冲击，传统出租车市场空间持续萎缩，司机收入锐减，但承包费用（份子钱）却居高不下。大量劳动所得被出租车公司（实际上是当局的“白手套”）收走，而真付出劳动的司机却难以维持生计，处境日益艰难。4月13日，陕西西安数百名出租车司机发起集体抗争行动，聚集在西安市出租车管理处，集体要求降低承包费用。期间，司机们在一名领头者的带领下，高喊“政府无良、打倒管理处、我们要生存、我们要吃饭”等口号。

Hundreds of Xi’an Taxi Drivers Rally to Demand Fee Reductions, Chanting “Unscrupulous Government” (2026.04.13)

In recent years, under the dual impact of ride-hailing services and bike-sharing platforms, the traditional taxi market has continued to shrink, causing drivers’ incomes to plummet. However, “contract fees” (known as fenziqian) remain high. A vast portion of their earnings is siphoned off by taxi companies—effectively acting as “white gloves” (proxies) for the authorities—leaving the actual laborers struggling to make ends meet in increasingly dire straits. On April 13, hundreds of taxi drivers in Xi’an, Shaanxi, launched a collective protest at the Xi’an Taxi Management Office, demanding a reduction in these fees. During the rally, led by a representative, the drivers chanted slogans such as: “Unscrupulous government!”, “Down with the Management Office!”, “We need to survive!”, and “We need to eat!”

《信宜事件后续》（2026.03.25)“2026年3月17至19日，广东省信宜市水口镇数百名村民连续三天走上街头，要求当局撤回紧邻村庄的火葬场项目，并两度与警察爆发激烈冲突。此后，当局连续数日出动大批特警进驻村庄，试图以高压手段”维稳”。然而，3月25日，村民们不畏重压，再度走上街头捍卫家园。”

“虽然此次抗争再度遭到当局暴力镇压，火葬场项目的推进几乎已成定局，但面对重重压力，信宜村民展现出了罕见的勇气与团结。在暴政之下，这样的抗争几乎难以取胜，但反抗是人的天性——哪里有压迫，哪里就有反抗。信宜村民今天的呐喊，或许改变不了村庄的命运，却让更多人看见，在这片土地上，仍有人在用血肉之躯，守护着最朴素的尊严。”

Follow-up on the Xinyi Incident(2026.03.25)

From March 17 to 19, 2026, hundreds of villagers in Shuikou Town, Xinyi City, Guangdong Province took to the streets for three consecutive days, demanding that authorities scrap a crematorium project situated near their village. They clashed violently with police on two separate occasions. In the days that followed, authorities deployed large numbers of riot police into the villages in an attempt to suppress dissent by force. Yet on March 25, the villagers refused to be intimidated and took to the streets once more to defend their homes.

Although the protest was once again met with violent crackdown, and the crematorium project now appears all but inevitable, the villagers of Xinyi have shown remarkable courage and solidarity in the face of overwhelming pressure. Under authoritarian rule, such resistance may rarely prevail — yet resistance is human nature. Where there is oppression, there will always be defiance. The cries of Xinyi’s villagers today may not change the fate of their village, but they have made visible to the world that in this land, there are still those who stand — with their own flesh and blood — to defend the most basic human dignity.

下载地址：https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_Bt3WpWS1VrbL8AsPWiZM7CHYsMDWsp7?usp=drive_link

「武汉上千市民集体抗争，怒拆六个小区收费杆（2026.03.24）」2026年3月24日夜，湖北武汉东湖高新区左岭新城，一场声势浩大的集体抗争行动震动全城。上千名居民自发聚集，接连拆除六个小区的收费道闸，终结了物业强制收费的计划。

起因

左岭新城是武汉东湖高新区规模最大的回迁安置社区，自2014年起陆续入住，现有常住居民近十万人，其中包括原左岭街道约四万名拆迁村民。社区建成十余年来，从未向居民收取停车费。

2026年元旦前后，小区物业突然引入一家第三方公司，宣布向住户征收每月30元的停车费，并在各小区出入口安装收费栏杆。消息一出，迅速在居民中引发强烈反响。

多名居民表示，小区土地属于回迁安置性质，居民已缴纳物业费，理应享有免费停车权利。更令居民不满的是，物业方在推行收费前既未召开业主大会，也未征询住户意见。部分居民还担忧，若此次收费顺利推行，日后费用可能还将逐年上涨。

冲突持续升级

自从强制收费政策实施以来，零星反抗持续不断，多个社区出现了破坏、拆除甚至驾车撞毁收费栏杆的事件。3月19日起，白浒社区的老年人们率先发起了集体抗争行动——在进入小区受阻后，他们选择堵门抗议，与收费人员发生多次正面冲突。

此后数日，抵制情绪持续蔓延。居民相互通知，呼吁联合行动。其间，有业主援引《民法典》第275条、第278条等相关条款，撰文阐述本次收费在程序与权属层面存在的法律问题，呼吁邻居团结维权，该文章在社区内广泛流传。

千人强拆六个社区收费杆

3月24日晚，事态进一步激化。抗争行动首先在白浒社区点燃——部分老人与收费人员短暂对峙后，随即将该社区所有收费杆强行拆除。消息迅速传开，老人们的行动得到了其他住户的支持，数以千计的村民走出家门，参与了此次抗争行动。

此后，抗争队伍以摧枯拉朽之势依次涌入玉泉社区、左岭四社区、三社区、二社区、一社区，将各处收费栏杆逐一摧毁。至当晚行动结束，六个社区的全部收费栏杆已荡然无存。这场由老人率先点燃、迅速席卷全社区的集体抗争，以居民的全面胜利告终——但能否守住这一成果，仍有待后续观察。

Thousands of Wuhan Residents Resist Collectively, Tearing Down Toll Barriers Across Six Residential Communities (2026.03.24)

On the night of March 24, 2026, a large-scale collective act of resistance shook the city of Wuhan. In Zuoling New Town, located in the East Lake High-Tech Development Zone of Hubei Province, thousands of residents spontaneously gathered and proceeded to dismantle toll gate barriers at six residential communities one after another, putting an end to the property management company’s plan to impose mandatory parking fees.

Background

Zuoling New Town is the largest resettlement community in Wuhan’s East Lake High-Tech Zone. Residents began moving in from 2014 onward, and the community now has a permanent population of nearly 100,000, including approximately 40,000 villagers relocated from the original Zuoling Subdistrict. In the more than ten years since the community was established, residents had never been charged for parking.

Around the 2026 New Year, the property management company suddenly brought in a third-party firm and announced it would charge residents a monthly parking fee of 30 yuan, installing toll barriers at the entrances and exits of each community. The news immediately sparked a fierce backlash among residents.

Several residents stated that, given the resettlement nature of the land and the fact that they already pay property management fees, they are entitled to free parking. What further angered residents was that the property company had neither convened an owners’ assembly nor sought residents’ input before implementing the charges. Some residents also worried that if the fees were successfully introduced this time, costs could rise year after year going forward.

Escalating Conflict

Since the mandatory fee policy took effect, sporadic resistance had been ongoing — incidents of toll barriers being damaged, dismantled, or rammed by vehicles were reported across multiple communities. Starting March 19, elderly residents of Baihu Community were the first to launch a coordinated collective action: after being blocked from entering the community, they staged a sit-in protest at the gate, leading to multiple direct confrontations with fee collectors.

In the days that followed, the spirit of resistance continued to spread. Residents notified one another and called for collective action. During this period, one homeowner drew on Articles 275 and 278 of the Civil Code and other relevant provisions to write an article explaining the procedural and property-rights legal issues with the new charges, urging neighbors to stand together and defend their rights. The article circulated widely throughout the community.

Thousands Forcibly Dismantle Barriers Across Six Communities

By the evening of March 24, the situation escalated further. The resistance was ignited first in Baihu Community — after a brief standoff with the fee collectors, some elderly residents forcibly tore down all the toll barriers in that community. News spread quickly, and the elderly residents’ actions drew support from other homeowners. Thousands of villagers left their homes and joined the effort.

The wave of resistance then swept through Yuquan Community, Zuoling Community No. 4, No. 3, No. 2, and No. 1 in swift succession, with toll barriers at each location demolished one by one. By the time the night’s action was over, every single toll barrier across all six communities had been completely removed. This collective act of resistance — sparked first by the elderly and rapidly engulfing the entire community — ended in a total victory for the residents. Whether they can hold onto this outcome, however, remains to be seen.

2026年3月，广东省信宜市水口镇，由于地方当局罔顾民意，强行在村庄附近修建火葬场，引发数百名村民连续三天抗议，并两度与警察爆发激烈冲突。

Documentary: The Xinyi Incident

In March 2026, in Shuikou Town, Xinyi City, Guangdong Province, hundreds of villagers staged three consecutive days of protests after local authorities pressed ahead with plans to build a crematorium near their village without public consent, leading to two violent clashes with police.

下载地址：https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_Bt3WpWS1VrbL8AsPWiZM7CHYsMDWsp7?usp=sharing

纪录片：「广东陆丰全城万人齐心反抗“禁炮令”（2026.03.07）」在广东陆丰，春节游神活动是当地一年中最隆重、最疯狂、也最具凝聚力的传统民俗盛事。当神明经过时，村民会点燃堆积如山的爆竹和烟花以示迎接，整个街道笼罩在硝烟和震耳欲聋的炮声中，场面如同“战场”般震撼，这也是当地人祈求“红红火火”的方式。然而，2026年，陆丰当局却不顾村民反对，强行出台“禁炮令”，禁止人们在春节游神期间燃放鞭炮，最终引发一场波及全城的大规模抗争。

Documentary: “The Unified Resistance of Tens of Thousands: Lufeng, Guangdong Defies the Firecracker Ban”

In Lufeng, Guangdong, the Chinese New Year Youshen (Parade of the Gods) is the most grand, frenetic, and unifying traditional folk event of the year. To welcome the passing deities, villagers ignite mountainous piles of firecrackers and fireworks, engulfing the streets in thick smoke and deafening blasts. The scene is as staggering as a “battlefield”—a ritual used by locals to pray for a life that is “red and booming” (prosperous). However, in 2026, despite fierce opposition from the villagers, Lufeng authorities forcibly implemented a “firecracker ban,” prohibiting the practice during the festival. This ultimately ignited a large-scale citywide protest.