运动式“反剖宫产”引发悲剧,家属维权与院方冲突(2025.12.15)

「运动式“反剖宫产”引发悲剧,家属维权与院方冲突(2025.12.15)」12月15日,湖南省衡阳县妇幼保健院爆发了一场激烈的医患冲突。家属们在住院部门口拉起白底黑字的横幅,上面写着:“医术低劣草菅人命,制造虚假病历,还我宝宝”。扩音器中传出的控诉声引来众多路人驻足。现场视频显示,医院人员在试图抢走横幅时,与维权的家属发生了冲突。

冲突的导火索,可以追溯到三天前一个新生儿的死亡。家属指控,衡阳县妇幼保健院为了控制剖宫产率指标,无视产妇两次强烈的剖宫产请求,强行要求顺产,最终导致惨剧发生。根据家属提供的详细时间线,这原本是一场可以避免的悲剧。产妇于2025年12月2日办理住院待产。12月4日下午,产程开始。在生产过程中,产妇因疼痛和对自身状况的担忧,曾两次明确向医生提出进行剖宫产手术,但均遭到当值医生的拒绝。12月4日14时45分,监测显示胎心出现异常,这通常是胎儿宫内缺氧的危险信号。然而,家属指控称,院方并未对此进行严密的持续监护,依然坚持“顺产优先”的处置原则。一小时后的15时45分,胎心率急剧下降。直到此刻,医生才意识到情况失控,紧急将产妇推入手术室进行剖宫产。7分钟后,也就是15时52分,孩子出生,但已被诊断为严重窒息。在进行了长达20分钟的心肺复苏后,奄奄一息的新生儿被转送至上级医院重症监护室。在经历了7天的生死搏斗后,奇迹没有发生。12月12日,孩子因抢救无效死亡。家属透露,事件发生后,医院为逃避责任,还制作了一份虚假报告。

近年来,中国卫生健康部门为扭转长期以来的“高剖宫产率”,将“提高自然分娩率”作为一项重要的政绩工程,在全国范围内推行严格的“降剖”行动。这一原本旨在回归科学、减少非医学指征剖宫产的倡议,在层层下压的科层制执行中,逐渐异化为一场“数字运动”。各地卫健委将剖宫产率直接挂钩医院等级评审、重点专科建设,甚至将其纳入公立医院绩效考核(国考)与院长任期目标责任制。对于衡阳县妇幼保健院这类基层专科医院而言,剖宫产率一旦“超标”,可能意味着评级降级或财政补贴的巨额削减。在这种“运动式治理”的压力下,医学指征的专业判断被迫向行政指标让步。医生在面临临界情况时,往往不敢果断决策,而是倾向于“再等等”、“以此搏一搏顺产率”。在衡阳这起悲剧中,产妇痛苦的诉求被视为需要克服的“阻力”,而非手术的理由;直到胎儿濒死时刻才启动的手术,正是这种为了保住“漂亮数据”而牺牲个体安全的典型恶果。

事态的后续发展则如同当下无数起底层维权事件的翻版,家属们在遭遇了院方的推诿卸责,警察的驱逐以及互联网的信息封锁后,迅速被推入孤立无援的境地。在一套娴熟的“维稳”组合拳后,家属的声音连同那个未及长大的生命一起,被迫在公共视野中彻底“消失”。

“Campaign-Style ‘Anti-Cesarean’ Policy Sparks Tragedy, Family Clashes with Hospital (2025.12.15)”

On December 15, a tense conflict erupted between patients’ families and staff at Hengyang County Maternal and Child Health Hospital in Hunan Province. Families gathered at the entrance of the maternity ward, displaying a white banner with black lettering that read: “Incompetent medical care, reckless disregard for life, falsifying medical records, return our baby.” Voices of protest through loudspeakers drew the attention of many passersby. Video footage from the scene shows hospital staff attempting to seize the banner, leading to clashes with the protesting family members.

The trigger for the conflict can be traced back to the death of a newborn three days earlier. The family accused Hengyang County Maternal and Child Health Hospital of ignoring the mother’s repeated requests for a cesarean section in order to control cesarean rate targets, insisting instead on vaginal delivery, which ultimately led to the tragedy. According to a detailed timeline provided by the family, the death could have been prevented.

The mother was admitted for labor on December 2, 2025. On the afternoon of December 4, labor began. During delivery, the mother explicitly requested a cesarean section twice due to severe pain and concerns for her condition, but both requests were denied by the attending physician. At 14:45, fetal monitoring indicated abnormal heart activity—a warning sign of potential fetal hypoxia. The family alleged that the hospital failed to conduct continuous, rigorous monitoring and continued to prioritize vaginal delivery. One hour later, at 15:45, the fetal heart rate dropped sharply. Only at this point did the doctors recognize the emergency and rush the mother to the operating room for a cesarean. Seven minutes later, at 15:52, the child was delivered but diagnosed with severe asphyxia. After 20 minutes of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the critically ill newborn was transferred to the intensive care unit of a higher-level hospital. After seven days of life-and-death struggle, the child died on December 12. The family claimed that the hospital even produced a falsified report to evade responsibility.

In recent years, China’s health authorities have sought to reverse the long-standing “high cesarean rate,” promoting “increasing natural births” as a key performance target. This initiative, originally intended to reduce non-medically indicated cesareans, has gradually been transformed into a nationwide “campaign-style” effort under hierarchical bureaucratic enforcement. Local health commissions link cesarean rates directly to hospital evaluations, specialty construction, and even the performance assessment of public hospitals and the target responsibilities of hospital directors. For grassroots hospitals such as Hengyang County Maternal and Child Health Hospital, exceeding cesarean rate limits could result in lower ratings or substantial cuts in funding.

Under this “campaign-style governance,” clinical judgment is often subordinated to administrative targets. Faced with borderline situations, doctors may hesitate to make decisive interventions, preferring to “wait and see” in hopes of maintaining vaginal delivery rates. In this Hengyang case, the mother’s urgent requests were treated as obstacles to overcome rather than valid reasons for surgery. The cesarean was performed only when the fetus was near death—a stark example of prioritizing “good statistics” over individual safety.

The aftermath mirrors countless other grassroots rights-defense incidents. After encountering hospital evasions, forced removal by police, and information suppression online, the family was quickly left isolated and powerless. Through a well-practiced combination of “stability maintenance” measures, the family’s voice—and that of the child who never grew up—was effectively erased from public view.

上海:《悲惨世界》演出结束后观众起立齐唱著名反抗歌曲“Do you hear the people sing“(2025.12.13)

「上海:《悲惨世界》演出结束后观众起立齐唱著名反抗歌曲“Do you hear the people sing“(2025.12.13)」12月13日,在上海大剧院上演的音乐剧《悲惨世界》40周年纪念版音乐会结束后,部分观众突然起立唱起了 “Do you hear the people sing”
这首歌曾在香港”雨伞革命”与“反送中运动”中被反复传唱,成为了争取民主自由的抗议之歌,是香港社会运动的重要象征。 (部分视频来自X:@azhongsb)

易力声大罢工结束:被国家机器与资本联合绞杀的“人矿”(2025.12.11-12)

「易力声大罢工结束:被国家机器与资本联合绞杀的“人矿”(2025.12.11-12)」

12月12日,广东深圳宝安区易力声工厂,随着最后一批工人无奈地走入工厂打卡复工,这场持续了八天、一度有三千人参与的大罢工宣告结束。正如这片土地上无数次发生的劳工抗争一样,这场起因于抵制变相裁员、牵动了海内外目光的集体行动,最终在强大的国家机器与资本利益的联合绞杀下,以工人的失败而告终。

工人被中共与资本联合绞杀

罢工的最后几天,工人们面临的压力达到了顶点。这股压力不再仅仅是经济上的窘迫,而是来自资方赤裸裸的威胁和公权力全方位的介入。12月10日,易力声公司发布了一份措辞严厉的“最后通碟”——《关于限期返岗复工及逾期处理决定的通知》。资方撕下了“管理人性化原则”的面具,挥舞起“开除”的大棒。通知明确声称,连续旷工超过三日或累计四日者将按自动离职处理,且不予任何经济补偿。为了彻底击溃工人的心理防线,公司还祭出了“胡萝卜加大棒”的策略:声明对于在12月12日13:30前“浪子回头”按时复工的员工,公司将“既往不咎”,其此前的缺勤不视同旷工。这一分化瓦解的策略很快奏效,工人们纷纷选择了妥协。

与此同时,中共开动国家机器,充当了资方最强有力的打手。首先,当局对工人们的发声通道实施了严密的封锁,在网络空间,工人们发现,他们的信息已经无法在几大社交平台上发出,过往的信息也已被删除一空。在舆论层面,没有任何中国媒体报道真相,试图接近现场的外媒记者也被“劝离”,工人彻底被孤立。在现实中,当局除了出动大量的警察在工厂门口拦截工人,抓捕工人,将工人关进所谓的“关爱职工”小屋限制人身自由外。还派遣警察和政府人员进入工人家中以及厂区,以“反诈普法”为名对工人进行威胁、恫吓,警告他们不得继续参与罢工。

最终,在中共与易力声的联合绞杀下,参与罢工的工人月来越少,到11日,仅有数十名工人还在工厂门口坚持。12日,在最后通牒的期限来临之前,这部分坚持到最后的工人,也被迫选择了放弃,罢工宣告结束。

失败后的工人:感到耻辱

在工人们的一个名为“坚持就是胜利”的维权微信群里,气氛沉重而压抑。这个群名在残酷的现实面前显得无比讽刺——在中国,坚持很多时候并不意味着胜利,从李旺阳到刘晓波,从高智晟到王炳章再到张展,从新疆到西藏再到香港,无数坚持者等来的往往是漫长的牢狱甚至死亡。

绝大部分工人对结果感到极度沮丧,一种深深的无力感和耻辱感在蔓延。有工人痛苦地表示:“搞了一个星期,每天早出晚归,还一分钱没有,倒贴上班,想想就不甘心。”还有工人对失败感到羞耻:“我抖音十几万粉丝都差不多知道我是易力声的,也知道我参与了,妈的,以后抖音都不敢发了。”

一位工人道出了大家的心声:“经历了这件事后,终于知道什么叫弱势群体的无助。”对于被迫复工,有人感叹:“不是怕损失,是心理得有承受能力,我感觉太折磨了,有时不是较真,而是为自己讨个公道。我被折磨的已经放弃了。”

面对失败,工人们只能互相打气:“至少我们努力坚持了,我们很优秀了。”更有工人直言:“人家偷猪脚都不丢脸,我们这样又不偷,又不抢,怕什么!”

中资与外资的反差更令工人心寒

就在不久前,同样位于珠三角的日资企业佳能在关闭工厂时,为被裁员工提供了高达2.3至2.5N+1的超额经济补偿。而作为中资企业的华勤技术在接手易力声后,不仅隐瞒股权变更事实,更企图通过“五天八小时”的手段变相裁员,以逃避最基本的法定赔偿。这一对比,进一步加深了工人们心中的寒意。

为什么中国工人的罢工注定艰难

易力声工人在没有外部支援的情况下坚持了整整八天,甚至一度通过集体行动迫使警方释放被捕工友,这已属不易。最终的失败,并非仅仅因为工人不够团结或策略失误,而是当前的制度所致,这是一场力量过于悬殊的对抗。

1.独立工会的缺失:由于中共政权明确不允许任何独立于党控制之外的工会组织存在,名义上的官方工会在劳资冲突中,往往扮演着维稳者甚至资方帮凶的角色。这就导致了工人在面对组织严密的资方和强大的国家机器时,一开始就处于绝对的劣势。在易力声罢工中,我们看到工人始终处于原子化的状态。他们无法选举出真正代表自己利益的谈判代表,无法形成统一的诉求,更无法进行持久的组织化动员。

2. 政权与资本共谋的“人矿”模式:在此次事件中,当局迅速而坚决地动用警力镇压维权工人,站队资方,这绝非偶然。中国“世界工厂”的崛起,本就建立在对数亿廉价劳动力——即所谓“人矿”——的极端压榨之上。为了维系这一模式,中共需要压低劳动力成本,确保“低人权优势”的投资环境。因此,一旦工人的维权行动危及这一模式,自诩为“工人阶级先锋队”的中共政权,便会毫不犹豫地撕下面纱,动用专政机器扑灭反抗。

如今,易力声大罢工的硝烟已经散去,工人们带着疲惫和伤痕重新回到了流水线。在中共政权现有的体制下,绝大多数类似的底层抗争,注定难以逃脱失败的宿命。但失败并非毫无意义。八天的坚持,是三千名劳动者对命运不公发出的怒吼,是作为“人”在被异化为机器零件时,出于本能的一次悲壮反抗。它再次撕开了“盛世”的表象,将中国经济奇迹背后那鲜血淋漓的劳工血泪,残酷地展现在世人面前。

“Yilisheng General Strike Ends: ‘Human Mine’ Jointly Crushed by State and Capital (Dec 11–12, 2025)”

On December 12, at the Yilisheng factory in Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, the last batch of workers reluctantly clocked in and returned to work, marking the end of an eight-day general strike that had involved as many as 3,000 participants. Like countless labor struggles on this land, this collective action—sparked by resistance to disguised layoffs and attracting attention both domestically and internationally—ultimately ended in failure under the joint crushing force of the powerful state machinery and capital interests.

Workers Crushed by the CCP and Capital

In the final days of the strike, the pressure on the workers reached its peak. This pressure was no longer merely economic hardship but included naked threats from management and comprehensive intervention by state authorities. On December 10, Yilisheng issued a sharply worded “final notice”—Decision on Deadline for Returning to Work and Handling of Overdue Cases. Management tore off the mask of “humane management” and wielded the stick of dismissal. The notice explicitly stated that employees who were absent for more than three consecutive days, or a total of four days, would be treated as having resigned voluntarily, with no economic compensation.

To completely break the workers’ morale, the company also employed a “carrot and stick” approach: those who returned to work on time by 13:30 on December 12 would have their past absences forgiven. This divisive tactic quickly worked, and many workers chose to compromise.

Meanwhile, the CCP mobilized state machinery to act as the strongest enforcer for the company. Workers’ channels of communication were strictly blocked; online, they found that their messages could no longer be posted on major social media platforms, and previous posts had been deleted. In terms of media coverage, no Chinese outlets reported the truth, and foreign journalists attempting to reach the scene were “persuaded to leave,” leaving workers completely isolated. On the ground, authorities deployed large numbers of police at factory entrances to intercept and arrest workers, confining them in so-called “employee care” rooms that restricted their freedom. Police and government personnel also visited workers’ homes and the factory under the guise of “anti-fraud legal education,” threatening and intimidating them not to continue participating in the strike.

Ultimately, under the joint crushing of the CCP and Yilisheng, the number of striking workers dwindled day by day. By December 11, only a few dozen workers remained outside the factory gates. On the 12th, before the deadline of the final notice, these last strikers were forced to give up, and the strike was officially over.

Workers After the Defeat: Feeling Humiliated

In a workers’ rights WeChat group ironically named “Persistence is Victory,” the atmosphere was heavy and oppressive. The group name now seemed tragically ironic—in China, persistence often does not equal victory. From Li Wangyang to Liu Xiaobo, from Gao Zhisheng to Wang Bingzhang to Zhang Zhan, from Xinjiang to Tibet to Hong Kong, countless persistent individuals have faced long imprisonment or even death.

Most workers expressed extreme frustration, with a deep sense of powerlessness and shame spreading among them. One worker lamented, “We’ve been at it for a week, working early and late every day, yet we haven’t earned a cent and even had to spend our own money to get to work. It’s infuriating.” Another expressed shame over the failure: “Almost all my TikTok followers know I’m from Yilisheng and that I participated. Damn it, now I don’t dare post on TikTok anymore.”

One worker voiced what many felt: “After this experience, I finally understood what it means to be helpless as a vulnerable group.” Regarding being forced to return to work, another said, “It’s not that I fear loss, it’s that you need the psychological endurance. It’s torturing—sometimes it’s not about being right, it’s about seeking justice for yourself. I’ve been tortured into giving up.”

In the face of defeat, workers could only encourage each other: “At least we tried our best and held on. That’s already something to be proud of.” Some bluntly remarked, “Those who steal pigs’ feet don’t feel ashamed—what are we afraid of, we neither steal nor rob!”

The Contrast Between Chinese and Foreign Capital Chills Workers

Not long ago, Japanese company Canon, also in the Pearl River Delta, provided employees being laid off with a generous severance of 2.3 to 2.5N+1 upon factory closure. In contrast, as a Chinese-owned company, Huaqin Technology, after taking over Yilisheng, not only concealed the change in ownership but also attempted to implement disguised layoffs via “five days, eight hours” to evade basic statutory compensation. This contrast deepened workers’ sense of bitterness.

Why Strikes Are Doomed for Chinese Workers

Yilisheng workers persisted for eight full days without external support and even managed, for a time, to force the police to release arrested colleagues—an achievement in itself. Their ultimate defeat, however, was not merely due to a lack of solidarity or strategic errors, but the result of the current system: a confrontation with an overwhelming power imbalance.

  1. Absence of Independent Unions: The CCP explicitly forbids any unions independent of party control. Official unions, in labor conflicts, often act as stabilizers or even as enforcers for management. This left workers at an absolute disadvantage from the outset when facing a well-organized employer backed by the state. During the Yilisheng strike, workers remained atomized: they could not elect representatives truly advocating their interests, could not form unified demands, and could not sustain organized mobilization.
  2. The “Human Mine” Model: Collusion Between State and Capital: In this event, authorities quickly and decisively deployed police to suppress striking workers, taking the side of management—a deliberate choice. China’s rise as the “world’s factory” has long been built on the extreme exploitation of hundreds of millions of cheap laborers—the so-called “human mines.” To maintain this model, the CCP needs to keep labor costs low and ensure an investment environment with “low human-rights costs.” Consequently, when workers’ actions threaten this model, the CCP, claiming to be the “vanguard of the working class,” will unhesitatingly unveil its authoritarian machinery to crush dissent.

Today, the smoke of the Yilisheng general strike has cleared, and workers have returned to the assembly lines, exhausted and scarred. Under the current CCP system, most grassroots struggles like this are doomed to fail. Yet failure is not meaningless. Eight days of persistence represent the outcry of 3,000 laborers against an unjust fate—a tragic act of human resistance when turned into mere machine parts. It once again tears open the veneer of the “prosperous era,” brutally exposing the blood and tears of laborers behind China’s economic miracle to the world.

浙金中心200亿爆雷事件持续发酵:多名维权投资人遭抓捕(2025.12.12)

「浙金中心200亿爆雷事件持续发酵:多名维权投资人遭抓捕(2025.12.12)」周五(12月12日),涉及200亿巨资的“浙金中心爆雷事件”继续发酵。当日,大批投资人聚集在浙金中心杭州办公地门口,希望政府能给出明确解决方案,但现场等待他们的是大量维稳警察,双方随即爆发冲突。据投资人透露,冲突期间有多名投资人遭到殴打,更有多人被警察从现场抓走,目前下落不明。

这场涉资逾200亿元、牵连近万名投资者的危机,源于11月底集中爆发的兑付失败,并在短短两周内迅速升级为大规模的跨城市维权行动。12月5日至今的一周里,投资者们辗转绍兴市政府、浙江省政府等多地,希望能拿回自己的投资款,但始终未能得到明确答复。

一位维权代表无奈地表示:“已经两周了,我们没有看到任何有效反馈。政府在2024年国资退出时没有全面公告,也没给百姓投资人留出退出机制。我们深陷其中,唯一的‘退出机制’竟然是把产品转让给其他不知情的老百姓接盘。”

投资者口中的“国资退出”,正是此次爆雷事件最核心的背景。爆雷主体“浙江浙金资产运营股份有限公司”,其前身是赫赫有名的“浙江金融资产交易中心”。2013年成立之初,其拥有鲜明的国资背景,创始股东包括国信弘盛、浙江省金融市场投资公司等。这份沉甸甸的“国资背书”,构建了投资者长达十年的信任基石。然而,其股权结构在近年发生了根本性且隐秘的变化。公开资料显示,原有国资股东陆续退出,浙金中心逐渐沦为民营资本——特别是祥源系的融资通道。

关键转折点出现在2024年10月,浙江省地方金融管理局发布公告,明确不再保留其金融资产交易业务资质,这本是重大风险信号。随后在2025年1月,公司悄然更名,由杭州民置投资管理有限公司接盘控股(持股58.57%)。绝大多数普通投资者对这些关乎资金安全的重大变动毫不知情,仍误以为在购买稳健的“国资平台产品”。

此次爆雷的直接导火索,是其核心融资方——祥源控股集团资金链的彻底断裂。据悉,浙金中心后期发行的大量表面上由祥源控股增信、年化收益率4%-5%的所谓“稳健型理财”,其底层资产大多指向祥源系的地产项目。有分析指出,祥源系的实际融资成本极高(可能达8%-9%),巨大的利差和风险被层层包装和掩盖。随着房地产市场深度下行,祥源系地产板块销售停滞、回款锐减,叠加商票逾期,深陷债务泥潭,最终导致资金链崩断。

危机在2025年11月底全面爆发。浙金中心APP上数百款与祥源系相关的产品集中违约。更令人恐慌的是,APP随后关闭了提现功能,甚至有投资人反映系统出现“钱已到账”的虚假提示。受事件影响,祥源系旗下三家上市公司迅速发布公告“撇清关系”,但市场并未买账,股价12日集体下跌。

截至12日下午,官方尚未出台任何实质性的兑付方案,投资人的维权之路仍在继续。

Zhejiang Financial Center’s 20-Billion-Yuan Collapse Continues to Escalate: Multiple Rights-Defending Investors Detained (2025.12.12)

On Friday (December 12), the “Zhejiang Financial Center collapse,” involving more than 20 billion yuan, continued to escalate. That day, large numbers of investors gathered outside the Hangzhou offices of the Zhejiang Financial Center, hoping the government would provide a clear resolution. Instead, they were met by a heavy police presence tasked with maintaining stability, and clashes quickly broke out. According to investors, several people were beaten during the confrontation, and more were taken away by police; their whereabouts remain unknown.

This crisis—affecting over 20 billion yuan and nearly 10,000 investors—originated in a wave of payment defaults that erupted in late November and rapidly escalated within just two weeks into a large-scale, cross-city rights-defense campaign. From December 5 onward, investors have traveled to multiple government offices, including the Shaoxing Municipal Government and the Zhejiang Provincial Government, seeking the return of their funds, but have yet to receive any clear response.

A representative of the investors said helplessly: “It’s been two weeks, and we haven’t seen any effective feedback. When state capital exited in 2024, the government did not make a comprehensive public announcement, nor did it leave ordinary investors with an exit mechanism. We are trapped, and the only so-called ‘exit mechanism’ is transferring products to other unsuspecting ordinary people to take over.”

What investors refer to as the “exit of state capital” is the core background of this collapse. The entity at the center of the crisis—Zhejiang Zhejin Asset Operations Co., Ltd.—was formerly the well-known Zhejiang Financial Asset Trading Center. Established in 2013, it initially had a prominent state-owned background, with founding shareholders including Guoxin Hongsheng and the Zhejiang Provincial Financial Market Investment Company. This heavy “state-owned endorsement” formed the foundation of investor trust for more than a decade. However, its ownership structure underwent fundamental and largely opaque changes in recent years. Public records show that original state-owned shareholders gradually withdrew, and the Zhejin Center increasingly became a financing channel for private capital—particularly the Xiangyuan group.

A key turning point came in October 2024, when the Zhejiang Provincial Local Financial Administration issued an announcement stating that the platform would no longer retain its qualification to conduct financial asset trading—an unmistakable signal of major risk. Then, in January 2025, the company quietly changed its name, with Hangzhou Minzhi Investment Management Co., Ltd. taking control as the majority shareholder (58.57%). Most ordinary investors were completely unaware of these critical changes affecting fund security and continued to believe they were purchasing stable “state-backed platform products.”

The immediate trigger for the collapse was the complete breakdown of the capital chain of its core financier—the Xiangyuan Holding Group. It is reported that a large number of products issued in the later stage by the Zhejin Center, ostensibly enhanced by Xiangyuan Holding and marketed as “prudent” investments with annualized returns of 4%–5%, were in fact largely backed by Xiangyuan-related real estate projects. Analysts point out that Xiangyuan’s actual financing costs were extremely high (possibly 8%–9%), with huge interest spreads and risks repeatedly packaged and concealed. As the real estate market sank into a deep downturn, Xiangyuan’s property sales stalled, cash inflows shrank sharply, and overdue commercial bills piled up, pushing the group into a debt quagmire and ultimately snapping its capital chain.

The crisis fully erupted in late November 2025. Hundreds of Xiangyuan-related products on the Zhejin Center app defaulted simultaneously. Even more alarming, the app subsequently disabled withdrawals, and some investors reported false system prompts claiming that “funds have been credited.” In response, three listed companies under the Xiangyuan group quickly issued announcements distancing themselves from the incident, but the market was unconvinced, and their share prices fell collectively on the 12th.

As of the afternoon of the 12th, authorities had yet to introduce any substantive repayment plan, and investors’ rights-defense efforts continue.

12月上旬制造业工人罢工事件汇总:欠薪成主要导火索(2025.12.01-10)

「12月上旬制造业工人罢工事件汇总:欠薪成主要导火索(2025.12.01-10)」2025年12月上旬,中国制造业连续爆发多起工人集体抗争事件。除了广东深圳易力声科技3000名工人持续了一周的大罢工外,“昨天”项目还记录到全国范围内另外10起制造业工人罢工事件。引发抗争的原因主要包括:欠薪、欠缴社保、企业搬迁不赔偿、裁员未补偿等。值得注意的是,其中一半的集体抗争事件发生在中国南方的广东省。以下为事件汇总:

12月1日至9日: 广东广州海鸥住宅工业股份有限公司工人连续9天罢工,抗议公司在未作出赔偿的情况下搬迁厂区。今年10月14日至15日,工人曾因此发起过持续两日的罢工。

12月1日: 江西睿达新能源科技有限公司工人集体罢工,讨要被拖欠了三个月的工资。

12月1日: 山西侯马普天通信电缆有限公司工人集体维权,抗议公司长期拖欠工资、欠缴社保,关闭工厂前也未对工人作出赔偿。普天通信的前身为邮电部侯马电缆厂。

12月5日至8日: 广东深圳宝安区嘉辉线业有限公司工人为讨要工资,连日在工厂楼顶上维权。

12月6日至8日: 湖北汉川妙虎纺织有限责任公司老板跑路,拖欠工人工资四个月未发放,引发工人连日维权,一度堵塞了交通。

12月6日至10日: 湖北汉川唯尚服饰有限公司老板欠薪跑路,工人连日驻守在工厂维权,防止公司私下出货。

12月8日: 广东深圳联华眼镜有限公司裁员未赔偿,引发工人集体维权,一度走上街头抗议。

12月9日: 广东深圳宝安区威富通讯技术有限公司老板跑路,拖欠工人四个月工资未发,引发工人集体维权。

12月10日: 广东深圳信濠光电科技股份有限公司工人在与公司谈判失败后,再次发起抗议行动。今年7月初,工人曾连续两天罢工,抗议公司搬迁厂区未赔偿工人。

12月10日: 江西吉安泰和茂盛环境有限公司拖欠工资、欠缴社保,并宣布放假到月底,引发工人集体罢工,一度堵塞了工厂大门。

在以上罢工事件中,有七起由欠薪引发,其中三个欠薪公司的老板已经跑路,下落不明。临近年底,工人们要提高警惕,提防老板跑路。

“Summary of Manufacturing Worker Strikes in Early December: Wage Arrears as the Main Trigger (2025.12.01–10)”

In early December 2025, China’s manufacturing sector saw a series of collective worker actions erupt across the country. In addition to the week-long strike of 3,000 workers at Yilisheng Technology in Shenzhen, the “Yesterday” project recorded 10 other manufacturing-sector strikes nationwide. The main causes included wage arrears, unpaid social insurance, factory relocation without compensation, and layoffs without severance. Notably, half of these collective actions occurred in Guangdong Province in southern China. Below is a summary of the incidents:

December 1–9:
Workers at Haio Residence Industrial Co., Ltd. in Guangzhou, Guangdong, went on a nine-day strike to protest the company’s relocation of the factory without offering compensation. Workers had previously held a two-day strike over the same issue on October 14–15 this year.

December 1:
Workers at Ruida New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. in Jiangxi staged a collective strike to demand three months of overdue wages.

December 1:
Workers at Potevio Communication Cable Co., Ltd. in Houma, Shanxi, launched collective action, protesting long-term wage arrears, unpaid social insurance, and the company’s failure to compensate workers before closing the factory. The company’s predecessor was the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications’ Houma Cable Factory.

December 5–8:
Workers at Jiahui Thread Industry Co., Ltd. in Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, protested unpaid wages by demonstrating for several days on the factory rooftop.

December 6–8:
At Miaohu Textile Co., Ltd. in Hanchuan, Hubei, the owner fled after failing to pay four months of wages, triggering days of worker protests that at one point blocked traffic.

December 6–10:
The owner of Weishang Garments Co., Ltd. in Hanchuan, Hubei, also absconded after owing wages. Workers stayed at the factory for multiple days to protest and prevent the company from secretly moving out goods.

December 8:
At Lianhua Eyewear Co., Ltd. in Shenzhen, Guangdong, layoffs without compensation sparked collective worker action, with workers briefly taking to the streets.

December 9:
At Weifu Communications Technology Co., Ltd. in Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, the owner fled after owing four months of wages, leading to collective protests by workers.

December 10:
Workers at Xinhao Optoelectronics Co., Ltd. in Shenzhen, Guangdong, launched a new round of protests after negotiations with the company broke down. In early July this year, workers had already gone on a two-day strike over relocation without compensation.

December 10:
At Maosheng Environmental Co., Ltd. in Taihe, Ji’an, Jiangxi, wage arrears, unpaid social insurance, and an announcement of a month-long shutdown triggered a collective strike that temporarily blocked the factory gate.

Among the above incidents, seven were triggered by wage arrears, and in three cases the company owner had already absconded and remains missing. As the end of the year approaches, workers should stay vigilant against employers running away without paying wages.

易力声罢工持续一周,工人团结施压迫当局释放被捕工友(2025.12.09–10)

「易力声罢工持续一周,工人团结施压迫当局释放被捕工友(2025.12.09–10)」截至周三(12月10日)中午,尽管承受着来自各方的巨大压力,广东深圳易力声工人始于上周四的“抵制变相裁员”行动仍在持续。周二白天,多名工人曾遭到警察抓捕。直至当晚,在工人们集体围堵工厂大门、长时间施压后,被抓捕的工人才最终获释。

周一,易力声发布了《关于考勤管理的补充说明》,称:“连续旷工超过三日者,或累计旷工四日者,以及一年内因违反公司人力资源管理制度被书面警告累计达到三次者,将视为自动离职,且不予任何赔偿。” 意图胁迫工人复工。

该声明发布后,部分工人迫于生计压力复工,但仍有大量工人顶住高压,于周二继续罢工,并聚集在工厂大门附近抗议。据工人透露,当局当天出动大批警察试图强行驱散人群,殴打工人并当场抓捕了多名维权者。现场视频还显示,当天曾有数名外国记者在现场拍照,但随即遭到警察驱赶。

当晚,局势陡然升级。上千名愤怒的工人集体围堵了工厂大门,高喊口号,要求警察立即释放被抓同伴。在持续对峙后,迫于工人强大的集体压力,当局最终释放了全部被抓捕人员,抗议人群才陆续散去。截至周三中午,工人的罢工行动仍在持续。

众所周知,中国没有独立工会,这直接导致中国工人的抗争行动往往一开始便处于一种“地狱模式”。无法建立组织,无法公开研讨对策,更难以形成稳定、持续的行动网络。即便是微信群这种最基本的沟通工具,也时刻面临封号与解散的风险。在这种情况下,工人的集体行动最终会被迫走向“原子化”,甚至连诉求也无法统一。许多罢工只能依赖临时聚集、口头传播或线下单独联络来维系;一旦组织者被抓捕,行动便迅速陷入瘫痪。因此,在中共与资方的双重压制下,中国工人运动鲜有成功先例,这也是中国劳工长期被迫接受低薪与超长工时的根本原因。

在这一现实背景下,易力声工人不仅在多重高压下连续罢工数日,还在骨干被抓捕后迅速以集体行动施压,成功迫使当局当场放人,这种情况在近年来的中国工运中极为罕见。因此,不论此次易力声工人的罢工行动将来是成功还是失败,他们的坚持本身已极具突破意义。

“Yilisheng Strike Enters Its Second Week: Workers’ Unity Forces Authorities to Release Detained Colleagues (2025.12.09–10)”

As of noon on Wednesday (December 10), despite immense pressure from all sides, the “resistance against disguised layoffs” launched last Thursday by workers at Yilisheng in Shenzhen, Guangdong, is still ongoing. During the daytime on Tuesday, several workers were detained by the police. It was not until that evening—after workers collectively blockaded the factory gates and maintained prolonged pressure—that the detained workers were finally released.

On Monday, Yilisheng issued a “Supplementary Explanation on Attendance Management,” stating: “Those who are absent from work continuously for more than three days, or cumulatively absent for four days; as well as those who receive three written warnings within one year for violations of the company’s human resources management regulations, will be deemed to have voluntarily resigned, and no compensation will be granted.” This move was clearly intended to coerce workers into returning to work.

After the statement was released, some workers, under pressure to make a living, returned to work. However, a large number of workers continued to withstand the pressure and carried on the strike on Tuesday, gathering near the factory gates to protest. According to workers, the authorities deployed a large number of police that day in an attempt to forcibly disperse the crowd, beating workers and detaining multiple rights-defending protesters on the spot. Videos from the scene also show that several foreign journalists were present taking photographs that day, but were quickly driven away by the police.

That night, the situation escalated sharply. More than a thousand enraged workers collectively blockaded the factory gates, chanting slogans and demanding the immediate release of their detained comrades. After a prolonged standoff, under the powerful collective pressure of the workers, the authorities ultimately released all of those who had been detained. Only then did the protesting crowd gradually disperse. As of noon on Wednesday, the strike was still ongoing.

As is well known, there are no independent labor unions in China. This directly means that Chinese workers’ struggles often begin in what can only be described as “hell mode.” They are unable to establish organizations, unable to openly discuss strategies, and even less able to form stable, sustained networks of collective action. Even something as basic as a WeChat group—the most elementary communication tool—constantly faces the risk of being shut down or dissolved. Under such conditions, workers’ collective actions are ultimately forced toward “atomization,” and even their demands cannot be unified. Many strikes can only be maintained through temporary gatherings, word-of-mouth communication, or individual offline contacts. Once organizers are detained, the movement quickly falls into paralysis. Therefore, under the dual repression of the Chinese Communist Party and capital, China’s labor movement has seen very few successful precedents. This is also the fundamental reason why Chinese workers have long been forced to accept low wages and excessively long working hours.

Against this broader reality, the Yilisheng workers not only managed to sustain their strike for several consecutive days under multiple layers of pressure, but also, after their key members were detained, swiftly exerted pressure through collective action and successfully forced the authorities to release them on the spot. Such a development is extremely rare in China’s labor movement in recent years. Therefore, regardless of whether the Yilisheng workers’ strike ultimately succeeds or fails, their persistence itself already carries profound breakthrough significance.

深圳易力声3000工人重启罢工:否认“贪心要加班”,直指变相裁员(2025.12.08)

「深圳易力声3000工人重启罢工:否认“贪心要加班”,直指变相裁员(2025.12.08)」经过周末两天的休整后,广东深圳易力声科技有限公司的3000名工人本周一继续罢工。期间,愤怒的工人一度走上街头表达抗议,但很快遭到警察拦截。另据工人透露,在此前的维权行动中,多名工人遭到当地警察恐吓并试图让他们放弃罢工。

这场大规模工人抗争始于2025年12月4日。当天,深圳易力声科技有限公司约3000名一线员工集体停工,聚集在工厂大门附近,抗议公司以“长期低薪”的方式变相裁员。罢工持续两天后进入周末,工人在短暂休整的同时,也对外界舆论作出集中回应,公开发布《易力声员工联合声明》,澄清维权并非“索要加班”,而是为讨薪、讨尊严、讨知情权。

员工澄清:不是要加班,而是反对“隐性裁员”

针对网络上流传的“罢工索要加班”的说法,员工在联合声明中明确否认,指出工人的核心诉求绝非追求额外的加班时长,而是反对公司借产能转移和股权变更之机,进行“隐性裁员”和压迫。

据工人们透露,早在2024年母公司被收购前,易力声就开始将深圳工厂的核心生产订单向越南转移。截至2025年11月,深圳厂区产能已缩减超过60%,曾经繁忙的产线如今仅保留了一款苹果蓝牙耳机的生产。

产能的被架空直接导致了严重的“僧多粥少”局面。公司随后推出“5天8小时”工作制,成为了引爆此次罢工的导火索。对于长期依赖“基本工资+加班费”维持生计的一线工人而言,这一制度意味着收入瞬间腰斩。

声明强调,在深圳这样的一线城市,仅按2750元/月的标准发放基本工资,工人实际到手仅2000元左右,根本无法覆盖房租和基本生活开支。工人们认为,这并非公司经营困难,而是刻意通过制造无法生存的低薪环境,“合法合规”地逼迫老员工主动离职,从而规避法定“N+1”经济补偿。

股权变更被长期隐瞒,员工知情权遭漠视

此外,声明还揭露了公司对重大股权变更的隐瞒。2024年下半年,华勤技术完成了对易力声母公司的控股收购,但这一关乎数千名员工命运的重大变动,全程未向员工告知,直到2025年11月员工才偶然发现。工人们认为,这种漠视员工知情权的行为,进一步印证了公司试图低成本清理人员的意图。

双重压力下的艰难维权:警察上门与公司威胁

最后,声明还透露,在此前维权期间,多名员工曾在半夜遭遇警察上门以普法、反诈名义进行恐吓,导致工人们人心惶惶。除了来自当局的压力之外,易力声也不停对工人施加压力。有工人爆料,公司内部群已下达指令,要求所有员工必须到岗,否则将按旷工处理。更为恶劣的是,在本周一上午罢工重启时,公司竟出动人员阻止工人进行刷卡操作,意图人为制造工人“旷工”的事实,为后续的处罚或解雇制造借口。

员工呼吁:要的是尊严、保障与公正

在联合声明的最后,员工表示,他们并不反对企业进行全球化布局,也不反对产业转移,但无法接受以牺牲老员工权益为代价的“隐性裁员”。员工呼吁社会各界关注事件真相,督促企业与华勤控股正面回应核心诉求:公示产能转移与股权变更的完整方案,按法律规定给予被影响员工合理经济补偿,明确深圳基地的岗位保障措施。

此外,尽管当局出动警察威胁工人并大量删除工人发布到网络上的信息,不少工人仍顶住压力,在网络上表达了坚决维权的决心。截至8日下午,工人的维权行动还在持续。

中共再次站在了劳工的对立面

不出意外,在此次易力声罢工事件中,自称“代表工农利益”的中共,再一次精准地站到了工人权益的对立面。面对企业通过转移产能、恶意压低工资、逼迫员工离职等一整套所谓“合法化裁员”操作,当局不仅没有介入调查企业是否侵权违法,反而第一时间选择出动警察,对维权工人进行恐吓、拦截与驱赶,同时启动审查机器,对工人在网络上发布的求助信息进行大规模封杀。

近年来,从富士康到比亚迪再到外卖骑手等一系列重大劳工维权事件中可以清楚看到,中共几乎一次不落地站在了资本一方,而不是工人一边。这并非偶然失误,而是赤裸裸的利益选择。一个在现实行动中长期背离其所宣称的“阶级基础”、系统性打压劳动者正当权益、没有任何合法性的政权,也终将被历史所清算。

Shenzhen Yilisheng: 3,000 Workers Resume Strike, Deny “Greedy Overtime Demands,” Point to Disguised Layoffs

(2025.12.08)

After two days of rest over the weekend, 3,000 workers at Shenzhen Yilisheng Technology Co., Ltd. resumed their strike on Monday. During the protest, angry workers briefly took to the streets to voice their demands but were quickly blocked by police. Workers also reported that during earlier rights-defense actions, several employees were intimidated by local police in attempts to force them to abandon the strike.

This large-scale labor struggle began on December 4, 2025. On that day, approximately 3,000 frontline workers at Shenzhen Yilisheng collectively stopped work and gathered outside the factory gates, protesting the company’s use of “long-term low wages” as a form of disguised layoffs. After two days of striking, the action entered the weekend. During their brief rest, workers issued a unified public response to outside opinion by releasing the “Joint Statement of Yilisheng Employees,” clarifying that their protest was not about “demanding more overtime,” but about fighting for unpaid wages, dignity, and the right to know.

Workers Clarify: Not Demanding Overtime, but Opposing “Hidden Layoffs”

In response to online rumors claiming that the strike was about demanding more overtime, the employees explicitly refuted this in their joint statement. They stressed that their core demand is not to pursue more overtime hours, but to oppose the company’s use of production transfers and ownership changes to carry out “hidden layoffs” and systematic pressure on workers.

According to workers, even before the parent company was acquired in 2024, Yilisheng had already begun shifting key production orders from Shenzhen to Vietnam. By November 2025, production capacity at the Shenzhen facility had been reduced by more than 60%. What was once a busy production line now retains only the manufacturing of a single Apple Bluetooth headset product.

The hollowing out of production capacity directly created a severe situation where “too many workers compete for too little work.” The company subsequently introduced a “five-day, eight-hour” work schedule, which became the direct trigger for this strike. For frontline workers who have long relied on a combination of base pay and overtime wages to survive, this policy meant their income was instantly cut in half.

The statement emphasized that in a first-tier city like Shenzhen, a base wage of only 2,750 yuan per month leaves workers with take-home pay of around 2,000 yuan—far from sufficient to cover rent and basic living expenses. Workers believe this is not due to business difficulties, but rather a deliberate attempt to create an unsustainable low-wage environment to force veteran employees to resign “legally and compliantly,” thereby evading the statutory “N+1” severance compensation.

Ownership Change Concealed for a Long Time, Workers’ Right to Know Ignored

The statement also exposed the company’s concealment of a major ownership change. In the second half of 2024, Huaqin Technology completed a controlling acquisition of Yilisheng’s parent company. However, this major development—one that directly affected the fate of thousands of workers—was never disclosed to employees. It was not until November 2025 that workers discovered it by chance. Workers believe this disregard for their right to know further confirms the company’s intention to clear its workforce at minimal cost.

Rights Defense Under Dual Pressure: Police Visits and Company Threats

Finally, the statement revealed that during earlier rights-defense actions, several workers were visited by police late at night under the pretext of legal education and anti-fraud campaigns, effectively intimidating them and spreading fear among employees. In addition to pressure from authorities, Yilisheng has continuously exerted pressure on its workers. Some employees reported that internal company groups issued orders requiring all workers to report to work immediately, otherwise they would be treated as absent without leave.

Even more egregiously, when the strike resumed on Monday morning, the company reportedly deployed personnel to block workers from clocking in, attempting to deliberately fabricate “absenteeism” records in order to create grounds for later punishment or dismissal.

Workers’ Appeal: Dignity, Security, and Justice

In the final part of the joint statement, workers said they do not oppose corporate globalization or industrial relocation. What they cannot accept is “hidden layoffs” carried out at the expense of veteran employees’ rights. They called on all sectors of society to pay attention to the truth of the incident and to urge the company and Huaqin Holdings to directly respond to their core demands:

  • Publicly disclose the full plan for production transfer and ownership changes
  • Provide fair and legal economic compensation to affected workers
  • Clearly define job security measures for the Shenzhen facility

Moreover, despite police intimidation and the large-scale deletion of workers’ online posts by authorities, many workers have continued to withstand the pressure and express their determination to defend their rights online. As of the afternoon of the 8th, the workers’ rights-defense action was still ongoing.

The CCP Once Again Stands Against Labor

As expected, in the Yilisheng strike, the Chinese Communist Party—despite claiming to “represent the interests of workers and peasants”—has once again positioned itself squarely against workers’ rights. Faced with the company’s use of production transfers, wage suppression, and forced resignations through so-called “legalized layoffs,” the authorities did not investigate whether the company violated labor laws. Instead, they immediately dispatched police to intimidate, block, and disperse striking workers, while simultaneously activating censorship mechanisms to carry out large-scale suppression of workers’ online appeals for help.

In recent years, from Foxconn to BYD, and from J&T Express to food delivery riders, nearly every major labor rights movement has shown the same pattern: the CCP consistently stands on the side of capital rather than labor. This is not an accidental mistake, but a naked choice of interests. A regime that systematically suppresses workers’ legitimate rights, while long betraying the “class foundation” it claims to represent, has already lost any basis of legitimacy—and will ultimately be judged by history.

房产证挡不住警察暴力:江西上饶社区强占小区大门(2025.12.04)

「房产证挡不住警察暴力:江西上饶社区强占小区大门(2025.12.04)」2025年12月4日,江西上饶汇佳学府名郡小区爆发了一起基层权力侵犯业主共有产权事件。当日,上饶经济技术开发区兴园街道滨河社区,纠集警察、特警、保安及政府工作人员共上百人,强行攻入小区,暴力占领了业主维权坚守了整整两个月的小区大门及原售楼部区域。冲突过程中,多名业主遭到殴打、抓捕,有人当场受伤倒地,现场一度失控。

据多名业主透露,9月15日,滨河社区悄然贴出一份告示,称将于月底正式入驻小区原售楼部一楼和二楼办公。然而,这份关乎全体业主重大利益的告示,并未张贴在必经区域,而是被刻意贴在了无人经过的角落,直到9月底才被偶然发现。

消息传开,业主群一片哗然。愤怒的核心在于对契约和产权的践踏: 首先,依据当初开发商的销售承诺及购房合同,售楼部撤走后,该区域大门出入口及相关建筑属于全体业主共有产权,计划建设图书馆与儿童游乐设施,合同中从未有过“社区入驻办公”的条款。 其次,程序完全非法。社区对外宣称“已与业主沟通”,但事实上,他们从未召开业主大会,从未征求业主签字同意,也拿不出任何合法的产权变更手续,一切仅凭一张暗贴的“告示”便要强行推进。

“承诺的游乐场和图书馆没了,我们自家的大门凭什么一声不吭就变成了政府办公场所?”多名业主愤慨地质问,“难道我们的房子是给社区买的办公楼吗?”

有业主透露,该社区此前曾试图以类似方式进入周边其他小区,因业主反对而失败。从9月底到12月初,面对业主的强烈法理质疑和集体抵制,滨河社区的入驻计划一度搁浅,业主似乎胜利在望。然而,业主最终等来的却是暴力。12月4日,社区人员联合百余名警力与安保人员突然集结,强行入驻。闻讯赶到大门前阻拦的业主迅速遭到镇压。现场视频显示,多名业主被警察强行抬走、拖离,还有业主被当场打倒在地,小区大门随即宣告失守。

在中共的权力体系中,社区处在最基层、最低端的位置。它不是严格意义上的行政机关,也不是独立自治组织,而是完全受制于街道办事处的末端执行单元。理论上,它只是“为居民服务的群众组织”;但在现实中,它是中共的黑手套,承担各种脏活,是中共维稳体系进入居民家中的最后一环。疫情期间,社区的这一功能被无限放大。它成为了各种极端管控措施的直接执行者。从物理上的封门焊门、深夜破门,到生存资源的断水断电;从人身自由方面的强制转运、强行集中隔离,再到基本权利方面的限制就医乃至人格羞辱,这些行为几乎全部发生在社区这一层级。

在汇佳学府名郡事件之前,社区强行入驻事件已经在各地多次发生。在今天的中国,即便是看似体面的商品房小区,即所谓的“城市中产”,在最底层权力面前依然毫无安全感可言。房产证挡不住警察暴力,业主大会敌不过社区“通知”,法律条文在一纸“工作需要”面前形同废纸。社区这个名义上“为居民服务”的组织,随时可以在上级授意下变成强制征用的执行者、暴力清场的前锋队。这起事件所真正令人不寒而栗的,并不仅仅是一次大门被夺、几名业主被打,而是它再次赤裸裸地提醒所有人:在中共统治之下,你所拥有的一切,都只是“暂时被允许拥有”。只要被“需要”,随时可以被收回,而你连说“不”的资格,都可能被直接清除。

Property Deeds Cannot Stop Police Violence: Shangrao, Jiangxi Community Joins Police to Seize Residential Compound Gate (Dec. 4, 2025)

On December 4, 2025, a grassroots abuse of power targeting homeowners’ collectively owned property erupted at Huijia Xuefu Mingjun Residential Compound in Shangrao, Jiangxi Province. On that day, the Binhe Community under Xingyuan Subdistrict of the Shangrao Economic and Technological Development Zone mobilized more than a hundred people—including police, SWAT units, security guards, and government staff—to forcibly storm into the compound. They violently seized the main entrance and the former sales office area, which homeowners had been defending through rights-protection efforts for a full two months. During the clash, multiple homeowners were beaten and detained; some were injured and fell to the ground, and the scene briefly spiraled out of control.

According to multiple homeowners, on September 15, the Binhe Community quietly posted a notice stating that it would officially move into the first and second floors of the former sales office by the end of the month for office use. However, this notice—affecting the significant interests of all homeowners—was not posted in a prominent area but deliberately placed in a remote corner, only being discovered by chance at the end of September.

Once the news spread, homeowners’ chat groups erupted with outrage. The core of the anger lay in the trampling of contracts and property rights. First, according to the developer’s original sales commitments and the purchase contracts, after the sales office was vacated, the entrance gate and related buildings belonged to all homeowners as jointly owned property, intended for a library and children’s recreational facilities. The contracts contained no clause allowing a “community office” to move in. Second, the process was entirely illegal. While the community claimed externally that it had “communicated with homeowners,” in reality it never convened a homeowners’ meeting, never sought homeowners’ signatures, and could not produce any legal documentation for a change in property rights. Everything was being pushed forward solely based on a secretly posted “notice.”

“The promised playground and library are gone—why did our own gate suddenly become a government office without a word?” several homeowners angrily asked. “Did we buy our homes to provide office space for the community?”

Some homeowners revealed that the community had previously attempted to enter other nearby compounds in a similar manner but failed due to homeowner resistance. From late September to early December, faced with homeowners’ strong legal challenges and collective opposition, the Binhe Community’s relocation plan was temporarily shelved, giving residents a sense of victory. However, what homeowners ultimately encountered was violence. On December 4, community personnel suddenly assembled with over a hundred police and security officers and forcibly moved in. Homeowners who rushed to the gate to block entry were swiftly suppressed. Videos from the scene show multiple homeowners being forcibly carried away and dragged off by police, while others were beaten to the ground; the compound gate soon fell.

Within the Chinese Communist Party’s power structure, community committees occupy the very lowest and most grassroots level. They are neither formal administrative organs nor independent self-governing organizations but are entirely subordinate enforcement units under subdistrict offices. In theory, they are merely “mass organizations serving residents.” In reality, they function as the CCP’s black glove, carrying out the dirtiest work and serving as the final link through which the stability-maintenance system penetrates directly into people’s homes.

During the pandemic, this function of community authorities was amplified. They became direct executors of extreme control measures—from physically sealing or welding doors shut, breaking into homes at night, to cutting off water and electricity; from forcibly transferring residents and imposing centralized quarantine, to restricting access to medical care and even carrying out public humiliation. Almost all of these abuses occurred precisely at the community level.

Even before the Huijia Xuefu Mingjun incident, forced community takeovers had occurred repeatedly across China. Today, even residents of seemingly respectable commercial housing estates—the so-called “urban middle class”—have no real security in the face of the lowest tier of power. Property deeds cannot withstand police violence; homeowners’ assemblies cannot resist a community “notice”; legal statutes become worthless in the face of a single phrase: “work needs.” This organization, nominally “serving residents,” can at any moment, under higher-level instructions, become the executor of forced requisitions and the vanguard of violent clearances.

What is truly chilling about this incident is not merely the seizure of a gate or the beating of several homeowners, but the stark reminder it provides: under CCP rule, everything you own is only “temporarily permitted.” Once deemed “needed,” it can be taken back at any time, and your very right to say “no” can be erased on the spot.

南阳反串网红罗大美遇害案二审开庭,上千网民集会声援求正义(2025.12.05)

南阳反串网红罗大美遇害案二审开庭,上千网民集会声援求正义(2025.12.05)」备受关注的河南南阳反串网红罗大美遭绑架勒索并被残忍杀害一案,于本周五(12月5日)在南阳市中级人民法院二审开庭。庭审当日上午,上千名从各地赶来的罗大美的粉丝与网民聚集在法院门口,高举罗大美生前照片,呼喊口号声援家属,要求法院严惩凶手。

从山村少年到善良主播:戛然而止的励志人生

1993年出生于河南禹州山区的罗大美,本名尚战锋,因家境贫寒,初中未毕业便进入纺织厂打工。凭着对戏曲的热爱与天赋,他在2010年考入南阳文化艺术学校,从一名纺织厂小工成长为专业的曲剧旦角演员。为凑齐学费,他常去酒吧、剧院奔波商演。2017年直播兴起,他抓住机遇,将精湛的戏曲功底与反串表演结合,巨大的反差魅力令他迅速走红,成为拥有百万粉丝的网红主播。

成名后的罗大美不仅凭努力改变了家族命运,为父母购车买房,资助妹妹读大学,还在疫情及水灾期间慷慨解囊,平日里对陌生人的求助也常施援手。正如他妹妹所言:“他永远是那个闪闪发光、善良温暖,未曾忘记回馈社会的人。”

然而,他的励志人生却因他的财富引来他人觊觎而戛然而止。这个人便是当地小有名气,嗜赌如命的余金生。据悉,罗大美曾因纠纷请托余金生处理事务,后察觉其为人难缠而刻意疏远,但终究没能逃脱魔爪。

熟人设局,残忍灭口:二百万换不回一条命

余金生在与罗大美交往过程中,知道了他是“网红”且比较有钱,为筹集赌资,便与同居女友沙玉姣及杨恒多次商议抢劫、勒索钱财。杨恒原为南阳某整形医院业务员,与罗大美认识多年,罗大美曾为其介绍了许多客户,两人因此成为好友,但这份友情却被杨恒利用。

2023年7月初,受余金生指使,杨恒曾多次约见罗大美,但未能成功。7月5日晚,杨恒通过微信成功将罗大美骗至余金生和沙玉娇的出租屋中。在拿到沙玉娇通过微信转给的500元“辛苦费”后,杨恒离开。随后,余金生将罗大美捆绑控制,伙同沙玉姣将其转移至南召县南河店镇桑树坪村亲戚的闲置平房内。期间,二人多次对罗大美进行威胁、恐吓,胁迫他向沙玉姣转账200余万元。

7月7日凌晨,余金生在与罗大美独处时,采用勒颈、短刀割刺颈部等方式将罗大美残忍杀害,并将尸体掩埋于红薯窖内。杀人后,三人并未立刻逃离,而是拿着罗大美的手机冒充其口吻,向家属和同事发送“开车撞人了”、“需要躲几天”、“别打电话”等虚假信息,成功拖延了报警时间。直到罗大美失踪五十多天后的2023年8月底,家属才察觉异常并报警。随后,沙玉娇与杨恒先后在南阳被抓。8月31日,潜逃至缅甸堵博,并将大部分赃款输光的余金生,在偷渡回国探听风声时被抓获。

一审判决引发争议:多方不服,家属难平

2025年2月28日及7月29日,南阳市中院对该案进行了两次不公开审理。期间,三被告当庭翻供否认指控。余金生辩称带罗大美去南召县是因听说罗说他坏话,“想让他受受罪”,并称巨额转账并非抢劫,而是罗大美“自愿赠予”。三被告均无赔偿意愿。2025年7月,罗大美家属撤回附带民事诉求,只求法院严惩凶手。

2025年10月,南阳中院作出一审判决:余金生死刑,沙玉姣死缓,杨恒有期徒刑十三年。这一结果未能平息风波。三名被告均不服判决,当庭上诉求轻判。另一方面,受害者家属认为三被告共同犯罪,分工明确,特别是关键人物杨恒仅判十三年,量刑过轻。家属表示,若无杨恒以朋友身份诱骗,余金生不可能得逞。家属曾向检察机关申请抗诉,但被南阳市检察院拒绝。

二审裁定:驳回上诉,维持原判

12月5日上午,二审开庭,上千名从各地赶来的粉丝及网友聚集在法院门口,要求严惩凶手,“杨恒死刑”、“沙玉娇死刑”的呼喊声此起彼伏。当局出动大量警力在现场戒备,双方未发生冲突。

当天下午,南阳中级人民法院作出二审裁定:驳回各方上诉,维持原判。即维持余金生死刑,沙玉娇死刑缓期二年执行,杨恒有期徒刑十三年的判决,并依法报请最高人民法院核准余金生的死刑。

判决公布后,家属虽感遗憾,但也表示只能接受,唯一欣慰的是主犯余金生的死刑已进入核准程序。家属希望能尽快接回罗大美的遗体,早日让他入土为安。然而,大量罗大美的粉丝及网友仍然无法接受这一结果,他们普遍认为起关键作用的杨恒判罚太轻,不足以起到警示作用,更有网友表达了对判决公正性的质疑:判决明显有问题,但他们不会承认。

“Second Trial Opens in the Murder Case of Nanyang Cross-Gender Performer Influencer ‘Luo Damei’; Thousands Rally Demanding Justice (2025.12.05)”

The widely watched case of Luo Damei — a cross-gender performer and popular online influencer from Nanyang, Henan — who was kidnapped, extorted, and brutally murdered, opened its second-instance trial this Friday (December 5) at the Nanyang Intermediate People’s Court. On Friday morning, thousands of Luo’s supporters and netizens from across the country gathered outside the courthouse, holding up his photos and chanting slogans in support of the family, calling for severe punishment for the perpetrators.

From Mountain Village Boy to Beloved Performer: A Promising Life Cut Short

Born in 1993 in a mountainous area of Yuzhou, Henan, Luo Damei — real name Shang Zhanfeng — grew up in poverty. He dropped out of junior high and began working in a textile factory. Fueled by talent and passion for traditional opera, he was admitted to the Nanyang Cultural and Arts School in 2010, transforming himself from a factory hand into a professional Quju opera “dan” role performer. To pay tuition, he performed in bars and theaters whenever he could.

When livestreaming platforms boomed in 2017, he seized the opportunity, combining his opera skills with cross-gender performance. The striking contrast and artistry quickly made him popular, earning him over a million followers.

After becoming famous, Luo changed his family’s life through hard work — buying a home and car for his parents and supporting his younger sister through university. He also donated generously during the pandemic and floods, and often helped strangers who sought assistance. His sister recalled, “He was always that shining, kind-hearted, warm person who never forgot to give back to society.”

But his inspiring rise ended abruptly when his wealth drew the attention of a gambler named Yu Jinsheng, a locally known figure with heavy gambling debts. Luo had previously asked Yu to help handle a dispute, but later distanced himself after realizing Yu’s character — yet he ultimately could not escape Yu’s scheme.

A Trap Set by Acquaintances: Two Million Yuan Extortion, a Life Lost Forever

During their interactions, Yu learned that Luo was a well-known influencer with money. To fund his gambling, Yu conspired with his live-in girlfriend Sha Yujiao and associate Yang Heng to rob and extort Luo. Yang, a former salesperson at a cosmetic surgery clinic, had known Luo for years and often received clients Luo referred to him — a friendship he ultimately betrayed.

In early July 2023, on Yu’s orders, Yang attempted several times to lure Luo out but failed. On the night of July 5, Yang succeeded in tricking Luo into coming to the apartment rented by Yu and Sha. After receiving a 500-yuan “reward” from Sha via WeChat, Yang left. Yu then tied up Luo, and with Sha’s help, moved him to an abandoned house in a rural village in Nanzhao County. Over the next day, they repeatedly threatened and intimidated Luo, forcing him to transfer more than 2 million yuan to Sha.

In the early hours of July 7, while alone with Luo, Yu strangled him and slit his neck with a short knife, killing him. They buried his body in a sweet-potato cellar. Instead of fleeing immediately, the three used Luo’s phone to impersonate him, sending messages such as “I hit someone with my car,” and “I need to hide for a few days,” successfully delaying any report to the police.

It wasn’t until late August 2023 — more than 50 days after his disappearance — that Luo’s family sensed something was wrong and called the police. Sha and Yang were soon arrested in Nanyang. On August 31, Yu, who had fled to Dobo, Myanmar and gambled away most of the stolen money, was caught after secretly returning to China to gather information.

Controversial First-Instance Verdict: Appeals Filed, Family Deeply Dissatisfied

The Nanyang Intermediate Court held two closed hearings on February 28 and July 29, 2025. All three defendants recanted in court. Yu claimed he had taken Luo to Nanzhao County only because he heard Luo had spoken ill of him and wanted to “teach him a lesson,” arguing the transfers were voluntary gifts, not robbery or extortion. None expressed any willingness to compensate the family.

In July 2025, Luo’s family withdrew their civil claims, stating they sought only severe punishment for the killers.

In October 2025, the court issued its first-instance verdict:

  • Yu Jinsheng — death penalty
  • Sha Yujiao — death with a two-year reprieve
  • Yang Heng — 13 years in prison

All three appealed in court, seeking lighter sentences. Meanwhile, Luo’s family strongly disagreed, arguing the trio committed the crime together with clear division of roles, and that Yang — the key figure who lured Luo — received an unreasonably light sentence. They sought prosecutorial protest, but the Nanyang Procuratorate declined.

Second-Instance Ruling: Appeals Rejected, Verdict Upheld

On the morning of December 5, during the second-instance hearing, thousands of supporters gathered outside the court, shouting “Death penalty for Yang Heng!” and “Death penalty for Sha Yujiao!” while heavily deployed police officers maintained order.

That afternoon, the court announced its ruling: all appeals rejected, original judgment upheld — including the death penalty for Yu, subject to approval by the Supreme People’s Court.

After the ruling, Luo’s family expressed regret but said they would accept the result, relieved that Yu’s death sentence had entered the approval process. They hope to retrieve Luo’s remains soon so he can be laid to rest.

Many of Luo’s fans and netizens, however, remain dissatisfied, believing Yang’s sentence is far too light given his pivotal role. Some openly questioned the fairness of the ruling, saying: “There’s clearly a problem with the verdict — they just won’t admit it.”

深圳易力声3000人大罢工,工人为何要抵制“5天8小时”(2025.12.04-05)

「深圳易力声3000人大罢工,工人为何要抵制“5天8小时”(2025.12.04-05)」周四(12月4日)起,位于广东深圳宝安区的易力声科技有限公司爆发大规模集体抗争行动。约3000名一线工人集体罢工,抗议公司长期实行“五天八小时”工作制。截至12月5日上午,工人的抗争行动仍在继续。

工人为何要抵制“5天8小时”工作制?

“五天八小时”本是国际通行的劳动标准,也是无数劳动者梦寐以求的工作节奏。但在易力声,工人们却为了反对它走上罢工——难道工人不喜欢休息?当然不是。

据多名工人透露,自2025年10月易力声取消加班以来,在扣除社保、公积金后,他们每月到手工资不足2000元,甚至低于深圳最低工资标准。根据深圳市政府2025年3月1日开始实施的标准,全日制就业劳动者最低工资标准不得低于2520元/月。

易力声曾是著名的“万人大厂”,因女性员工众多而被称为“女儿国”。随着产业转移和工厂规模收缩,如今只剩下约3000名员工,许多当年的年轻女工已步入中年,肩负着沉重的家庭负担。“在深圳,一个月两千块钱连自己都养不活,怎么养家?”对她们而言,加班费是维持生存所必须的口粮。

罢工导火索:长期“5天8小时”公告

12月3日,易力声公司发布的一则公告成为了此次大罢工的导火索。公告称受海外需求疲软影响,核心客户订单减少约20%,决定未来几个月继续维持“五天八小时”工作制,暂无加班安排。作为补偿,公司仅承诺在十二月为未加班的员工发放200-300元不等的一次性生活补助。

这则通知彻底点燃了工人的怒火。据工人透露,早在2024年,易力声母公司香港易路达国际的股权就已发生重大变更,其80%的股份被华勤技术收购,但公司并没有在易主后对工人作出赔偿。工人们认为,所谓“订单减少”,不过是订单向越南工厂转移。长期实行5天8小时,目的是以低薪逼走工人,逃避法定的N+1遣散费。“厂里用五天八小时的方式来耗着我们,想让我们自己走人,不想赔钱,”一位工人愤怒地表示。公司此时严格执行“国际标准”,并非为了员工福祉,而是将原本保护劳工的条款“武器化”,作为逼退员工的合法手段。

12月4日上午,罢工爆发,数千名工人聚集在工厂大门附近,阻拦了拉货车辆,高喊“赔钱、坚持”等口号。期间,一名工人与保安发生冲突,警察在试图抓走该工人时一度被围堵。工人们的诉求非常明确:要么恢复正常的加班以保障基本收入,要么就按照工龄进行合法赔偿。

僵局持续:工人坚持核心诉求

面对压力,易力声公司于4日下午发布通知,声称经与“部分员工代表”商讨,提高了未来几个月的月补贴标准至400-500元,并承诺在12月和明年1月有限增加周末加班工时,同时强硬要求员工于5日早8点前复工,否则按旷工处理。

然而,这份新提议遭到工人一致抵制。他们认为几百元的补贴杯水车薪,且对公司承诺的加班表示强烈不信任。更重要的是,工人们否认了所谓“员工代表”的合法性,因为他们并没有经过员工推选,而是易力声自行选定的。工人们仍坚持自己的诉求,要么恢复正常的加班以保障基本收入,要么就按照工龄进行合法赔偿。截至5日中午,工人们的抗争还在继续。

此次易力声罢工事件,也暴露了中国制造业工人面临的普遍困境:他们的生存高度依赖“超时劳动”。许多工厂为了控制成本并确保赶工能力,刻意将正常工作时间的薪资压低至仅能糊口的水平,迫使工人为了获取更高工资,而不得不接受长时间工作。而当企业将“遵守8小时工作制”作为变相裁员的工具时,工人们为了最低的生存底线,被迫陷入了抵制休息权、争取“加班权”的悲壮抗争中。毕竟,如果基本工资足以维持体面生活,没有人愿意每天工作12小时做“牛马”。

Shenzhen Yilisheng 3,000-Worker Strike: Why Are Workers Resisting the “Five-Day, Eight-Hour” Workweek?(Dec 4–5, 2025)

Starting Thursday, December 4, a large-scale labor action broke out at Yilisheng Technology Co., Ltd., located in Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong. Around 3,000 frontline workers went on strike, protesting the company’s long-term enforcement of the “five-day, eight-hour” workweek. As of the morning of December 5, the workers’ protest was still ongoing.

Why Are Workers Resisting the “Five-Day, Eight-Hour” Workweek?

The five-day, eight-hour workweek is an internationally recognized labor standard and a work schedule many employees dream of. But at Yilisheng, workers went on strike to oppose it—does this mean they dislike rest? Certainly not.

According to multiple workers, since Yilisheng canceled overtime in October 2025, after deductions for social insurance and housing fund contributions, their take-home pay has dropped below 2,000 yuan per month—below Shenzhen’s minimum wage. According to the Shenzhen municipal government, as of March 1, 2025, the minimum monthly wage for full-time employees is 2,520 yuan.

Yilisheng was once a well-known “10,000-worker factory,” often called a “women’s kingdom” because of its high proportion of female employees. As production shifted and the factory downsized, it now employs only around 3,000 people. Many of the former young female workers are now middle-aged with heavy family responsibilities. “In Shenzhen, 2,000 yuan a month isn’t even enough to support yourself—how can you support your family?” For them, overtime pay is not a bonus—it is a lifeline.

Trigger: Announcement of Continued “Five-Day, Eight-Hour” Schedule

On December 3, the company issued a notice that became the spark for the strike. It stated that due to weak overseas demand, core client orders had dropped by around 20%, and the five-day, eight-hour schedule would continue in the coming months, with no overtime arranged. As compensation, the company promised a one-time allowance of 200–300 yuan for daily-wage employees who did not work overtime in December.

This announcement ignited workers’ anger. Workers noted that as early as 2024, the parent company—Hong Kong Yiluda International—underwent a major ownership change, with 80% of shares acquired by Huaqin Technology, yet no compensation was provided to employees. Workers believe the so-called “order reduction” is actually a shift of production to factories in Vietnam. Maintaining the five-day, eight-hour schedule is a tactic to push employees out at low pay, avoiding legally mandated N+1 severance. “The factory is using the eight-hour schedule to wear us down, hoping we quit on our own—they don’t want to pay,” one worker said angrily. The strict enforcement of “international standards” is not for employee welfare, but a legal tool to force out workers.

Strike Erupts: Thousands Block Factory Gate

On the morning of December 4, thousands of workers gathered at the factory gate, blocked delivery vehicles, and chanted slogans such as “Pay us, we insist.” During the protest, a worker clashed with security, and police attempting to detain him were temporarily blocked by fellow workers. The workers’ demands are clear: either restore normal overtime to ensure basic income or provide lawful severance according to years of service.

Standoff Continues: Workers Hold Firm

Under pressure, Yilisheng issued a notice on the afternoon of December 4, claiming that after consulting “some employee representatives,” monthly allowances would be increased to 400–500 yuan for the coming months, and limited weekend overtime would be added in December and January. Employees were also required to return by 8 a.m. on December 5, or face disciplinary action for absenteeism.

The workers unanimously rejected this proposal. They consider a few hundred yuan insufficient, mistrust the promised overtime, and do not recognize the so-called “employee representatives,” who were selected by the company rather than elected by staff. Workers continue to insist on their demands: either restore normal overtime to ensure basic income or provide lawful severance according to years of service. As of midday December 5, the protest was still ongoing.

A Broader Picture: The Plight of Manufacturing Workers in China

The Yilisheng strike also highlights a broader issue faced by China’s manufacturing workers: their livelihood heavily relies on “overtime labor.” Many factories deliberately suppress regular wages to bare-minimum levels to control costs and meet production targets, forcing workers to accept long hours to earn enough to survive. When companies weaponize compliance with the eight-hour workweek as a tool for de facto layoffs, workers must fight to defend their basic survival, often resisting rest in order to demand “overtime rights.” After all, if basic wages were sufficient for a decent life, no one would willingly work 12 hours a day like a “beast of burden.”